



# Dubai Electronic Security Center

## Dubai PKI

### DESC Subordinate CAs Certificate Policy

**Title** DESC Subordinate CAs, Certificate Policy

**Classification** PUBLIC

**File Name** DubaiPKI-DESCSubordinateCAs-CertificatePolicy\_v2.3

**Created on** 18 May 2017

**Revision** 2.3

**Modified on** 16 Jan 2026

# Document History

Date	Revision	Author(s)	Summary
18 May 2017	0.1	Khawla Hassan	Initial version
12 September 2017	0.2	Khawla Hassan	Minor modifications & Incorporation of Dubai government entity Root CA option
3 November 2017	0.3	Khawla Hassan	Minor modifications to reflect control environment
11 January 2018	0.4	Khawla Hassan	Update certificate profiles
18 January 2018	0.5	Khawla Hassan	Second revision of certificate profiles
30 January 2018	1.0	Khawla Hassan	Issue final version
25 February 2018	1.1	Khawla Hassan	Update publication of certificate information
16 October 2018	1.2	Khawla Hassan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Updates based on regular review, in addition to adding practices related to certificates issued for email protection.</li><li>Expand the government entities community to cover all UAE government entities.</li></ul>
07 August 2019	1.3	Khawla Hassan	Added a reference to the CPSs for the detailed list of circumstances of revocation
3 June 2020	1.4	Khawla Hassan	Updates based on regular review
11 April 2021	1.5	Khawla Hassan	Annual review and updates to address Mozilla comments and clarify subordinate CAs governance and operating environment
13 July 2021	1.51	Khawla Hassan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>Add user authentication certificate profile (for natural persons)</li><li>Increase the CRL lifetime to 72 hours</li></ul>

1 <sup>st</sup> April 2022	1.6	Khawla Hassan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual review</li> <li>• General enhancements on the document</li> <li>• Adding two new CAs: Code Signing CA and Timestamping CA</li> <li>• Move the Timestamping certificate from the Devices CA to the Timestamping CA</li> <li>• Move the Code Signing certificate from the Corporate CA to the Code Signing CA</li> <li>• Moving the signature verification response signing from the Devices CA to the Corporate CA</li> <li>• Add signing and authentication certificates issued for UAE visitors to the Corporate CA</li> </ul>
7 <sup>th</sup> September 2022	1.7	Khawla Hassan	Correct typographical errors and general enhancements
6 April 2023	1.8	Khawla Hassan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual review</li> <li>• Add more options of identity vetting as per the CS BRs</li> <li>• Add more clarifications on the time limits for re-use of validation information</li> <li>• Align the definitions and log retention with the SSL BRs</li> </ul>
2 <sup>nd</sup> November 2023	1.9	Khawla Hassan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Updates reflecting deactivation of Devices CA. This includes marking of relevant Certificate Policy OIDs as deprecated and updating relevant provisions to indicate that it is no longer supported under the Dubai PKI</li> <li>• Remove the references to SSL BRs and update Definitions</li> </ul>
08 April 2024	2.0	Khawla Hassan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual review</li> </ul>

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Remove obsoleted enrollment channels by the UAE PASS (IDP Registered Users)</li> </ul>
27 February 2025	2.1	Mohamed Khalifa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Annual review</li> <li>• Updates to allow offline deployment of Sub CAs</li> </ul>
17 April 2025	2.2	Mohamed Khalifa	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provisions related to Ethaq Plus CA</li> </ul>
16 Jan 2026	2.3	Mohamed Khalifa	Announcement of planned decommissioning of the Code Signing Certification Authority and Devices Certification Authority

# Table of Contents

Document History .....	2
1. Introduction .....	7
1.1 Overview.....	7
1.2 Document name and Identification .....	10
1.3 PKI Participants .....	12
1.4 Certificate Usage .....	15
1.5 Policy Administration.....	16
1.6 Definitions, Acronyms and References .....	16
2. Publication and Repository Responsibility .....	24
2.1 Repositories .....	24
2.2 Publication of Certificate Information .....	24
2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication Repositories .....	24
2.4 Access Controls on Repositories .....	25
3. Identification and Authentication .....	26
3.1 Naming.....	26
3.2 Initial Identity Validation.....	29
3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-keying requests .....	33
3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests .....	34
4. Certificate Life Cycle Management.....	35
4.1 Certificate Application.....	35
4.2 Certificate Application Processing .....	35
4.3 Certificate Issuance .....	36
4.4 Certificate Acceptance .....	37
4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage.....	37
4.6 Certificate Renewal.....	37
4.7 Certificate Re-key .....	38
4.8 Certificate Modification .....	38
4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension .....	39
4.10 Certificate Status Services.....	41
4.11 End of Subscription.....	41
4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery .....	41
5. Facility, Management and operational Controls.....	42
5.1 Physical Controls .....	42
5.2 Procedural Controls .....	43
5.3 Personnel Controls.....	44
5.4 Audit Logging Procedures .....	45
5.5 Records Archival .....	47
5.6 Key Changeover .....	48
5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery .....	48
5.8 CA or RA Termination .....	49
6. Technical Security Controls.....	51

6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation .....	51
6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls .....	52
6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management.....	54
6.4 Activation Data.....	55
6.5 Computer Security Controls .....	55
6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls.....	56
6.7 Network Security Controls.....	57
6.8 Time-stamping .....	57
7. Certificate, CRL profiles .....	58
7.1 Certificate Profile .....	58
7.2 CRL Profile .....	58
7.3 OCSP Profile .....	59
8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments.....	60
8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessments .....	60
8.2 Identity and Qualifications of the Assessor .....	60
8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Party .....	60
8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment.....	60
8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency .....	61
8.6 Communication of Results .....	61
8.7 Self-audits .....	61
9. Other Business and Legal Matters .....	62
9.1 Fees .....	62
9.2 Financial Responsibility.....	62
9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information .....	63
9.4 Privacy of Personal Information.....	63
9.5 Intellectual Property Rights .....	64
9.6 Representations and Warranties .....	64
9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties.....	65
9.8 Limitations of Liability.....	65
9.9 Indemnities.....	65
9.10 Term and Termination .....	65
9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants .....	65
9.12 Amendments .....	66
9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures .....	66
9.14 Governing Law.....	66
9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law .....	66
9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions .....	66
9.17 Other Provisions.....	67

# 1. Introduction

This Certificate Policy (CP) defines the requirements applicable to DESC Corporate CA, Devices CA, Code Signing CA, Timestamping CA, and Ethaq Plus CA, referred to as “DESC Subordinate CAs” that are signed by the Dubai Root CA.

DESC establishes and operates these subordinate CAs for issuing end-entity certificates to entities, citizens, residents and visitors in the UAE.

The PKI certification services are offered by DESC Subordinate CAs in accordance with the present CP and a dedicated Certification Practice Statement (CPS) for each Subordinate CA.

This CP meets the formal requirements of Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [RFC 3647] regarding content, format and content. While certain clause titles are included according to the structure of [RFC 3647], the topic may not necessarily apply in the implementation of the CA, such sections state “No stipulation”. Additional information is presented in subsections of the standard structure where required.

This CP aims to comply with the below requirements published at <https://www.cpacanada.ca>:

- WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities
- WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities - Network Security
- WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities – Code Signing Baseline Requirements

The Dubai PKI is committed to maintain this CP in conformance with the current versions of the below requirements published at <http://www.cabforum.org>:

- CA/Browser Forum Network and Certificate System Security Requirements
- CA/Browser Forum Baseline Requirements for Code Signing (“Baseline Requirements for Code Signing”)

If there is any inconsistency between this document and the requirements above, the above requirements take precedence over this document.

Further information about this document and DESC Subordinate CAs can be obtained from the Dubai PKI Policy Authority (PA), which is representing the policy and governing body for the Dubai PKI including DESC Subordinate CAs. Contact information of the Dubai PKI PA is provided under section 1.5.

## 1.1 Overview

The “Dubai PKI” uses standard PKI technologies, policies and operating procedures and application interfaces. The Dubai PKI comprises the Dubai PKI Root CA that is the trust anchor of this PKI, which comes at the first level of the PKI hierarchy. The Dubai PKI also comprises multiple Subordinate Certification Authorities (CAs), hereinafter, DESC Subordinate CAs, which come at the second level of the PKI hierarchy. DESC owns and operates the Dubai PKI Root and the aforementioned Subordinate CAs to provide certification services that enable individuals and entities in the UAE to conduct secure electronic transactions; this includes securing the machine-to-machine communication where devices can transact securely, leveraging the PKI signing and encryption capabilities.

Additionally, the Dubai PKI Root CA aims to sign subordinate CAs belonging to government or private sector entities. Such entities have their own custom needs and reasons to implement their own CAs rather than using a DESC Subordinate CAs.

CAs belonging to other entities come at the second level of the Dubai PKI hierarchy, being signed by the Dubai PKI Root CA. These issuing CAs will be directly signed by the Dubai PKI Root CA, which makes them subordinate CAs owned by the corresponding government or private sector entity but operated by DESC. Policies and procedures of these Subordinate CAs must follow and be in full compliance with Dubai PKI Root CA CP/CPS.

The Dubai PKI Root CA and DESC Subordinate CAs are established and operated by DESC. DESC is the authority that has the final responsibility of providing governmental PKI certification services in the UAE, i.e., issuing and managing subordinate and end-entity certificates for entities, forming its community of subscribers.

### 1.1.1 Dubai PKI Hierarchy

The below Figure depicts the Trust Model of the Dubai PKI. The Dubai PKI Root CA is the top authority in this PKI with regard to the digital certification services offered by Dubai PKI. The Dubai PKI Root CA signs DESC Subordinate CAs, which come at the second level of the PKI hierarchy. In addition, the Root CA also signs issuing CAs belonging to authorized government or private sector entities.

DESC is fulfilling the role of the Policy Authority (PA) for the Dubai PKI (hereinafter, Dubai PKI PA) shall authorize the Root certification services for DESC Subordinate CAs as well as the issuing CAs owned by other government or private sector entities.




Figure 1: Trust Model for Dubai PKI

### 1.1.2 Dubai PKI Policy Authority (PA)

The Dubai PKI Policy Authority (PA), composed of appointed members of the DESC management and the Dubai PKI team, is representing the policy and governing body for the Dubai PKI. The PA is the highest-level management body with final authority and responsibility for:

- Specifying and approving the Dubai PKI infrastructure,
- Approving government and private sector entities applications to have their own Subordinate CA(s) within the Dubai PKI hierarchy,

- Specifying, maintaining and approving the Dubai PKI practices and policies, in particular the Certification Practice Statements (CPS) and the related Certificate Policies (CP) when applicable,
- Review annual audit report submitted by government or private sector entities CAs to ensure continuous compliance to Dubai PKI requirements,
- Review regular audit reports of LRAs,
- Enforcing CP/CPS and other policies applicable to Dubai PKI Environment,
- Defining the review process for such practices and policies including responsibilities for maintaining the Dubai PKI CPs/CPSs and related policies,
- Defining the review process that ensures that the Dubai PKI properly implements the above practices,
- Defining the review process that ensures that the related policies are supported by the Dubai PKI CPs and CPSs,
- Publication of CP and CPS documents,
- Specifying installation, key ceremonies, operation and life-cycle management (including deprecation) procedures of the Dubai PKI,
- Evaluating the proper working of the Dubai PKI environment,
- Allocating members to the key ceremonies as witness as well as trusted operatives and key custodians,
- Evaluating changes to the Dubai PKI environment (management, operational, hardware, software and security),
- Evaluating case-by-case issues where key Dubai PKI staff/personnel did not respect the security and/or operational procedures, including ethics,
- Deciding on critical issues in case of incidents, disasters and other severe problems with regards to the Dubai PKI.

### **1.1.3 Certificate Policy**

X.509 certificates issued by the Subordinate CAs to subscribers will contain a registered OID in the certificate policy extension that in turn shall be used by a Relying Party (RP) to decide whether a Certificate is trusted for a particular purpose. Subscriber Certificates issued by the Subordinate CAs will identify the applicable policy in the certificate Policies extension by including applicable OID(s).

### **1.1.4 Relationship Between the This CP and each Subordinate CA CPS**

DESC Subordinate CAs CPSs establish the practices for the issuance, acceptance, maintenance, use, reliance upon, and revocation of digital certificates issued by the Subordinate CAs as governed by this CP and related documents which describe the Dubai PKI requirements and use of Certificates.

### **1.1.5 Planned Decommissioning of Certification Authorities**

The following Certification Authorities are planned to be decommissioned and are subject to a controlled decommissioning process:

- Code Signing Certification Authority

- Devices Certification Authority

No new certificates shall be issued under these Certification Authorities following the effective date specified in the applicable Decommissioning Notice published in the public repository specified in section 2.

The availability and duration of certificate status information services for decommissioned Certification Authorities are defined in the applicable CPS and in publicly published Decommissioning Notice.

Further details regarding the decommissioning process, timelines, and relying party considerations are provided in the Decommissioning Notice published in the CA Repository.

## 1.2 Document name and Identification

This document is named 'Dubai PKI DESC Subordinate CA Certificate Policy' and is referenced as such in related documents.

The Object Identifier (OID) of this document is 2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.1.2.1.

DESC organizes the OID for the certificates it issues as depicted in the tables below:

### *Corporate CA*

OID	Certificate type	Description
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.1	Encryption certificates	Encryption certificates for individuals (e.g., document encryption)
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.2	<b>[Deprecated]</b> Authentication certificates	Certificates for individual authentication purposes
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.6	Authentication certificates	Certificates for individual authentication purposes
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.3	Digital signature certificates (high assurance)	Digital signing certificates for individuals to be used for signing transactions that require a high assurance level of identity vetting
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.4	Digital signature certificates (moderate assurance)	Digital signing certificates for individuals to be used for transactions that does not require the highest assurance levels of identity vetting
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.7	Visitors digital signature certificates (high assurance)	Digital signing certificates for individuals to be used for signing transactions that require a high assurance level of identity vetting. Issued for UAE visitors.
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.8	Visitors digital signature certificates (moderate assurance)	Digital signing certificates for individuals to be used for transactions that does not require the highest assurance levels of identity vetting. Issued for UAE visitors.
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.9	Visitors mobile authentication certificates	Certificates for individuals installed on the mobile e.g. to trust personal smart device. Issued for UAE visitors.
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.2.1	eSeal certificates (high assurance)	Certificates used to apply eSeals on documents issued by an entity (legal)

		person) to confirm the identity of the document issuer, the origin and integrity of the data source in these documents
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.2.2	Code signing certificates  <u>[Starting from April 2022, the Corporate CA is not going to issue Code Signing Certificates. These certificates are going to be rather issued from the Code Signing CA]</u>	Certificates for (software) code signing purposes
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.3.4	Signature verification service certificate	Certificate used to sign the verification responses generated by the DESC signature verification service

#### *Certificates used to be supported under the Devices CA*

OID	Certificate Type	Description
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.3.1	Device certificates  <b>[Deprecated effective 5<sup>th</sup> October 2023]</b>	Certificates for general identification and authentication of devices
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.3.3	VPN certificates  <b>[Deprecated effective effective 5<sup>th</sup> October 2023]</b>	Device identification and session data encryption for VPN (IPsec-based connections)
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.3.2	SSL certificates  <b>[Deprecated effective effective 5<sup>th</sup> October 2023]</b>	SSL certificates used for server authentication and session data encryption
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.3.1.1	Time stamping certificates  <u>[Starting from April 2021, the Devices CA is not going to issue Timestamping Certificates. These certificates are going to be rather issued from the Timestamping CA]</u>	Certificates intended for the Dubai PKI TSA (Time Stamping Authority)

#### *Code Signing CA*

OID	Certificate Type	Description
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.2.2	Code signing certificates	Certificates for (software) code signing purposes

#### *Timestamping CA*

OID	Certificate Type	Description
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.3.1.1	Time stamping certificates	Certificates intended for the Dubai PKI TSA (Time Stamping Authority)

OID	Certificate Type	Description
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.10	Short-lived, Digital signature certificates (high assurance)	Digital signing certificates for individuals to be used for signing transactions that require a high assurance level of identity vetting
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.1.11	Short-lived, Digital signature certificates (moderate assurance)	Digital signing certificates for individuals to be used for transactions that does not require the highest assurance levels of identity vetting
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.2.3	Long-lived, eSeal certificates (high assurance)	Certificates used to apply eSeals on documents issued by an entity (legal person) to confirm the identity of the document issuer, the origin and integrity of the data source in these documents
2.16.784.1.2.2.100.1.2.2.3.6	Long-lived, LRA certificate	Certificate used to authenticate certificate management requests sent by third-party LRAs

**Note:** Certain certificate types listed in the section were historically issued. These certificate are marked as **[Deprecated]**, and **no new certificates are issued** under these profiles. They remain documented for transparency and relying party awareness.

## 1.3 PKI Participants

The participants within the context of DESC Subordinate CAs are as follows:

- Policy Authority (PA)
- Subordinate Certification Authorities
- Registration Authority (RA)
- Local Registration Authority (LRA)
- Subscribers
- Relying Parties

These participants and their roles are described in the following sections.

### 1.3.1 Certification Authorities

The table below lists DESC Subordinate CAs operated by DESC and the certificates issued by these CAs.

Certification Authority	Supported certificates
Corporate CA	X.509 (V3) certificates for Government entities, Citizens, Residents and Visitors in the UAE (encryption, signature and authentication) in addition to OCSP and Signature verification response signing certificates.

Certification Authority	Supported certificates
Devices CA	<p>X.509 (V3) end-entity certificates for devices (generic device, SSL and VPN) in addition to OCSP response signing certificates.</p> <p>Starting 5<sup>th</sup> October 2023, this CA is not going to issue end-entity certificates. However the CA services will be kept running to only maintain validation information and support revocation of time stamping certificates issued on and before 5 May 2021.</p>

*This CA is scheduled for Decommissioning as announced in Section 1.1.5*

Certification Authority	Supported certificates
Code Signing CA	X.509 (V3) end-entity certificates for Code Signing, in addition to OCSP response signing certificates.

*This CA is scheduled for Decommissioning as announced in Section 1.1.5*

Certification Authority	Supported certificates
Timestamping CA	X.509 (V3) end-entity certificates issued to a Timestamp Authority to use to timestamp data, in addition to OCSP response signing certificates.

Certification Authority	Supported certificates
Ethaq Plus CA	X.509 (V3) certificates for Government and Private Sector entities, Citizens, Residents and Visitors in the UAE (signature and authentication) in addition to OCSP response signing certificates.

The certification services offered by DESC Subordinate CAs are broken down in this document as follows:

- **Registration service:** Verifies the identity and, if applicable, any specific attributes of end-entities applying for certificates. The results of this service are passed to the certificate generation service.
- **Certificate generation service:** Creates and signs end-entity certificates based on the verification conducted by the registration service.
- **Dissemination service:** Disseminates the end-entity certificates and makes them available to relying parties. This service also makes available any public policy and practice information to subscribers and relying parties.
- **Revocation management service:** Processes requests and reports relating to revocation to determine the necessary action to be taken. The results of this service are distributed through the certificate validity status service.
- **Certificate validity status service:** Provides certificate validity status information to relying parties. This shall be based upon certificate suspension/revocation lists. The status information shall always reflect the current status of the certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs.

All certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs shall conform to the rules and requirements as stated in this policy document.

### 1.3.2 Registration Authority

DESC shall set up or delegate the RA function for DESC Subordinate CAs. However, DESC shall not delegate the validation process of domain ownership or control to any third-party RA, this shall rather be performed only by DESC RA team.

The RA function consists in Registration Authority officers, products, systems, and procedures used to validate the identity of subscribers requesting the issuance of certificates from DESC Subordinate CAs. Involvement in the RA function shall be limited to duly authorized individuals with the required clearance and other personal controls as stated in section 5.3 of this document.

#### ***Local Registration Authority (LRA)***

DESC allows Organizations with Legal Existence in UAE aiming to manage the certificates life cycle for their own communities to set up and act as a Local Registration Authority (LRA) for the Corporate CA and/or the Ethaq Plus CA.

DESC accepts the following LRAs:

- Officer duly authorized by the Organization: DESC RA will enroll This LRA officer to DESC CA. He will receive credentials that allow to access the CA remotely through a dedicated Web RA application and manage the digital certificates of the Organization's subscribers community.
- System/application: Operated by the Organization and integrated with DESC CA through a secure interface exposed by the CA. The system/application is configured with dedicated credentials issued by DESC RA so that it can request certificates from DESC CA and manage the subscribers' community certificates.
- The UAE national Authentication and Digital Signing platform (known as UAE PASS) is an example of an LRA application that is currently integrated with the Corporate CA to issue and manage Authentication and Signing certificates for Citizens, Residents and Visitors of the UAE.

The entities aim to act as an LRA shall sign an agreement with DESC through which it commits to operate their LRA in accordance with and this CP and DESC Subordinate CA CPS. The LRA agreement describes the LRA obligations/responsibilities for:

- Authenticating, approving, or rejecting certificate application requests
- Identify subscribers in accordance with naming conventions defined within the present CP and the applicable CPS to ensure uniqueness and unambiguity
- Submit certification requests to DESC Subordinate CAs only for the applications that have been validated and approved by the LRA
- Creating and maintaining an audit-log that records all significant events related to the RA's operations and fulfilment of the above-mentioned responsibilities
- Providing selective access to audit-log records as specified in this CP
- Implementing other operational controls as specified in this CP
- Ensuring that the information that it stores and processes is handled in a manner that is consistent both with the policies and procedures defined in this document and with the Dubai PKI security's regulations.

### 1.3.3 Subscribers

Subscribers of DESC Subordinate CAs are listed in the below table:

Certification Authority	Subscribers
Corporate CA	Government entities, Government employees and the Citizens/Residents/Visitors in the UAE
Devices CA	Government entity infrastructure devices such as VPNs, web servers, routers, switches and other devices
Code Signing CA	Government entities
Timestamping CA	DESC Timestamping Authority service, in addition to Timestamping authority services owned and operated by other Dubai Government entities
Ethaq Plus CA	Government and Private Sector entities with legal existence in the UAE, Citizens, Residents, Visitors of the UAE. In addition to the Ethaq Plus CA OCSP responder

For any certificate, the subscriber ratifies to the terms and conditions of DESC subscriber agreement.

### 1.3.4 Relying Parties

A Relying Parties are entities that rely on a certificate and/or a digital signature verifiable with reference to a public key listed in a subscriber's certificate issued by DESC Subordinate CAs.

Relying parties shall always verify the validity of a digital certificate issued by DESC Subordinate CAs using the provided Certificate Validations Services (e.g. CRL, OCSP), prior to relying on information featured in the certificate.

### 1.3.5 Other Participants

There are no other participants within the context of DESC Subordinate CAs.

## 1.4 Certificate Usage

### 1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Use

Use of certificates issued from DESC Subordinate CAs is restricted by using certificate extensions on key usage and extended key usage, which will be configured according to the certificate type. Please refer to the CPS of each respective subordinate CA for the specific restrictions that apply to each type of certificate.

DESC reserves the right to issue test certificates for DESC internal testing and quality assurance purposes. Test certificates will be issued by DESC RA that enforces the following rules:

- test certificates have a short lifetime (in days)
- certificate subject DN for test certificates always includes the word "TEST"

### 1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Use

Certificate use is restricted by using certificate extensions on key usage and extended key usage. Any usage of the certificate inconsistent with these extensions or with the contents of this CP and applicable CPS is unauthorized.

# 1.5 Policy Administration

## 1.5.1 Organization Administering the Document

DESC, through the Dubai PKI Policy Authority (further “PA”), is bearing responsibility for the drafting, publishing, OID registration, maintenance, and interpretation of this CP, and other policies and practices within the realm of the Dubai PKI.

## 1.5.2 Contact Person

Inquiries, suggested changes, or notices regarding this CP should be directed to **Dubai PKI Policy Authority**:

Dubai Electronic Security Center  
PO Box 36996, Dubai, UAE  
Phone +97144150400  
Email [pa@desc.gov.ae](mailto:pa@desc.gov.ae)

### Certificate Problem Report

Refer to the applicable CPS.

## 1.5.3 Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

The Dubai PKI PA determines the suitability of any CPS for this CP.

## 1.5.4 CP Approval Procedures

A dedicated process involves the PA reviewing the initial version of this CP and any subsequent updates. Amendments shall either be in the form of a document containing an amended form of the CP or an update notice. The PA formally approves the new version of the CP.

In an effort to maintain credibility and promote trust in this CP and better correspond to accreditation and legal requirements, the Dubai PKI PA shall review this CP at least annually and may make revisions and updates to policies as it sees fit or as required by other circumstances. Any updates become binding for all Certificates that have been issued or are to be issued upon the date of the publication of the updated version of this CP.

# 1.6 Definitions, Acronyms and References

## 1.6.1 Definitions

**Affiliate:** A corporation, partnership, joint venture or other entity controlling, controlled by, or under common control with another entity, or an agency, department, political subdivision, or any entity operating under the direct control of an Entity.

**Applicant:** The natural person or legal person that applies for (or seeks renewal of) a Certificate. Once the Certificate issues, the Applicant is referred to as the Subscriber. For Certificates issued to devices, the Applicant is the entity that controls or operates the device named in the Certificate, even if the device is sending the actual certificate request.

**Applicant Representative:** A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant: 1. who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or 2. who signs and

submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or 3. who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

**Anti-Malware Organization:** An entity that maintains information about Suspect Code and/or develops software used to prevent, detect, or remove malware.

**Application Software Supplier:** A supplier of software or other relying-party application software that displays or uses Code Signing Certificates, incorporates Root Certificates, and adopts these Requirements as all or part of its requirements for participation in a root store program.

**Attestation Letter:** A letter attesting that Subject Information is correct written by an accountant, lawyer, government official, or other reliable third party customarily relied upon for such information. In the context of this CP, attestation letters are signed by Human Resource teams of government entities.

**Audit Period:** In a period-of-time audit, the period between the first day (start) and the last day of operations (end) covered by the auditors in their engagement. (This is not the same as the period of time when the auditors are on-site at the CA.)

**Audit Report:** A report from a Qualified Auditor stating the Qualified Auditor's opinion on whether an entity's processes and controls comply with the mandatory provisions of these Requirements.

**Authorized Representative:** A natural person or human sponsor who is either the Applicant, employed by the Applicant, or an authorized agent who has express authority to represent the Applicant: (i) who signs and submits, or approves a certificate request on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (ii) who signs and submits a Subscriber Agreement on behalf of the Applicant, and/or (iii) who acknowledges the Terms of Use on behalf of the Applicant when the Applicant is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

**Baseline Requirements:** The Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Code Signing Certificates as published by the CA/Browser Forum.

**CA Key Pair:** A Key Pair where the Public Key appears as the Subject Public Key Info in one or more Root CA Certificate(s) and/or Subordinate CA Certificate(s).

**Certificate:** An electronic document that uses a digital signature to bind a public key and an identity.

**Certification Authority:** An organization subject to these Requirements that is responsible for a Code Signing Certificate and, under these Requirements, oversees the creation, issuance, revocation, and management of Code Signing Certificates. Where the CA is also the Root CA, references to the CA are synonymous with Root CA.

**Certificate Beneficiaries:** All Application Software Suppliers with whom the CA or its Root CA has entered into a contract for distribution of its Root Certificate in software distributed by such Application Software Suppliers and all Relying Parties who reasonably rely on such a Certificate while a Code Signature associated with the Certificate is valid.

**Certificate Data:** Certificate requests and data related thereto (whether obtained from the Applicant or otherwise) in the CA's possession or control or to which the CA has access.

**Certificate Management Process:** Processes, practices, and procedures associated with the use of keys, software, and hardware, by which the CA verifies Certificate Data, issues Certificates, maintains a Repository, and revokes Certificates.

**Certificate Policy:** A set of rules that indicates the applicability of a named Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.

**Certificate Problem Report:** Complaint of suspected Key Compromise, Certificate misuse, or other types of fraud, compromise, misuse, or inappropriate conduct related to Certificates.

**Certificate Profile:** A set of documents or files that defines requirements for Certificate content and Certificate extensions in accordance with Section 7 of the corresponding CA CPS.

**Certificate Revocation List:** A regularly updated time-stamped list of revoked Certificates that is created and digitally signed by the CA that issued the Certificates.

**Certificate Requester:** An authorized administrator of a device or system who is responsible for submitting the certification requests to the CA/RA.

**Certification Practice Statement:** One of several documents forming the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.

**Code:** A contiguous set of bits that has been or can be digitally signed with a Private Key that corresponds to a Code Signing Certificate.

**Code Signature:** A Signature logically associated with a signed Code.

**Code Signing Certificate:** A digital certificate issued by a CA that contains a Code Signing EKU.

**Timestamping Certificate:** A digital certificate issued by a CA that contains a Timestamping EKU.

**Control:** “Control” (and its correlative meanings, “controlled by” and “under common control with”) means possession, directly or indirectly, of the power to: (1) direct the management, personnel, finances, or plans of such entity; (2) control the election of a majority of the directors ; or (3) vote that portion of voting shares required for “control” under the law of the entity’s Jurisdiction of Incorporation or Registration but in no case less than 10%.

**Country:** Either a member of the United Nations OR a geographic region recognized as a Sovereign State by at least two UN member nations.

**CSPRNG:** A random number generator intended for use in a cryptographic system.

**Declaration of Identity:** A written document that consists of the following:

1. the identity of the person performing the verification,
2. a signature of the Applicant,
3. a unique identifying number from an identification document of the Applicant,
4. the date of the verification, and
5. a signature of the Verifying Person.

**Delegated Third Party:** A natural person or Legal Entity that is not the CA, and whose activities are not within the scope of the appropriate CA audits but is authorized by the CA to assist in the Certificate Management Process by performing or fulfilling one or more of the CA requirements found herein.

**Expiry Date:** The “Not After” date in a Certificate that defines the end of a Certificate’s validity period.

**Government Agency:** In the context of a Private Organization, a Government Agency is the authority in the Jurisdiction of Incorporation responsible for establishing the legal existence of such organizations (e.g., the agency that issues the Certificate of Incorporation). For Business Entities, it is the government authority in the jurisdiction of operation that registers business entities. In the case of a Government Entity, it refers to the entity that enacts laws, regulations, or decrees establishing the legal existence of Government Entities.

**Government Entity:** A Dubai government entity or other government entities in the UAE authorized by Dubai PKI PA to consume the PKI services.

**Hardware Security Module:** a device designed to provide cryptographic functions, especially the safekeeping of private keys.

**High Risk Certificate Request:** A Request that the CA flags for additional scrutiny by reference to internal criteria and databases maintained by the CA, which may include names at higher risk for phishing or other fraudulent usage, names contained in previously rejected certificate requests or revoked Certificates, names listed on the Miller Smiles phishing list or the Google Safe Browsing list, or names that the CA identifies using its own risk-mitigation criteria.

**Individual:** A natural person.

**Issuing CA:** In relation to a particular Certificate, the CA that issued the Certificate. This could be either a Root CA or a Subordinate CA.

**Key Compromise:** A Private Key is said to be compromised if its value has been disclosed to an unauthorized person, or an unauthorized person has had access to it.

**Key Generation Script:** A documented plan of procedures for the generation of a CA Key Pair.

**Key Pair:** The Private Key and its associated Public Key.

**Legal Entity:** An association, corporation, partnership, proprietorship, trust, government entity or other entity with legal standing in a country's legal system. Also referred to as "**Legal Person**" in this document.

**Legal Existence:** A Private Organization, Government Entity, or Business Entity has Legal Existence if it has been validly formed and not otherwise terminated, dissolved, or abandoned.

**Object Identifier:** A unique alphanumeric or numeric identifier registered under the International Organization for Standardization's applicable standard for a specific object or object class.

**OCSP Responder:** An online server operated under the authority of the CA and connected to its Repository for processing Certificate status requests. See also, Online Certificate Status Protocol.

**Organizational Applicant:** An Applicant that requests a Certificate with a name in the Subject field that is for an organization and not the name of an individual.

**Non-EV Code Signing Certificate:** Term used to signify requirements that are applicable to Code Signing Certificates which do not have to meet the EV requirements. This CA issues Non-EV Code Signing certificate.

**Online Certificate Status Protocol:** An online Certificate-checking protocol that enables relying-party application software to determine the status of an identified Certificate. See also OCSP Responder.

**Parent Company:** A company that Controls a Subsidiary Company.

**Platform:** The computing environment in which an Application Software Supplier uses Code Signing Certificates, incorporates Root Certificates, and adopts these Requirements.

**Private Key:** The key of a Key Pair that is kept secret by the holder of the Key Pair, and that is used to create Digital Signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.

**Policy Qualifier:** Policy-dependent information that accompanies a certificate policy identifier in an X.509 certificate.

**Public Key:** The key of a Key Pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of the corresponding Private Key and that is used by a Relying Party to verify Digital Signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.

**Public Key Infrastructure:** A set of hardware, software, people, procedures, rules, policies, and obligations used to facilitate the trustworthy creation, issuance, management, and use of Certificates and keys based on Public Key Cryptography.

**Publicly-Trusted Certificate:** A Certificate that is trusted by virtue of the fact that its corresponding Root Certificate is distributed as a trust anchor in widely- available application software.

**Qualified Auditor:** A natural person or Legal Entity that meets the requirements of Section 8.2.

**Random Value:** A value specified by a CA to the Applicant that exhibits at least 112 bits of entropy.

**Registered Domain Name:** A Domain Name that has been registered with a Domain Name Registrar.

**Registration Authority (RA):** Any Legal Entity that is responsible for identification and authentication of subjects of Certificates, but is not a CA, and hence does not sign or issue Certificates. An RA may assist in the certificate application process or revocation process or both. When “RA” is used as an adjective to describe a role or function, it does not necessarily imply a separate body, but can be part of the CA.

**Reliable Data Source:** An identification document or source of data used to verify Subject Identity Information that is generally recognized among commercial enterprises and governments as reliable, and which was created by a third party for a purpose other than the Applicant obtaining a Certificate. In the context of this CP, the UAE official gazette is the reliable data source for government entities in UAE.

**Reliable Method of Communication:** A method of communication, such as a postal/courier delivery address, telephone number, or email address, that was verified using a source other than the Applicant Requester.

**Relying Party:** Any natural person or Legal Entity that relies on a Valid Certificate. An Application Software Supplier is not considered a Relying Party when software distributed by such Supplier merely displays information relating to a Certificate.

**Repository:** An online database containing publicly-disclosed PKI governance documents (such as Certificate Policies and Certification Practice Statements) and Certificate status information, either in the form of a CRL or an OCSP response.

**Root CA:** The top level Certification Authority whose Root Certificate is distributed by Application Software Suppliers and that issues Subordinate CA Certificates.

**Root Certificate:** The self-signed Certificate issued by the Root CA to identify itself and to facilitate verification of Certificates issued to its Subordinate CAs.

**Signature:** An encrypted electronic data file which is attached to or logically associated with other electronic data and which (i) identifies and is uniquely linked to the signatory of the electronic data, (ii) is created using means that the signatory can maintain under its sole control, and (iii) is linked in a way so as to make any subsequent changes that have been made to the electronic data detectable.

**Sovereign State:** A state or country that administers its own government, and is not dependent upon, or subject to, another power.

**Subject:** The natural person, device, system, unit, or Legal Entity identified in a Certificate as the Subject. The Subject is either the Subscriber or a device under the control and operation of the Subscriber.

**Subject Identity Information:** Information that identifies the Certificate Subject. Subject Identity Information does not include a domain name listed in the subjectAltName extension or the Subject commonName field.

**Subordinate CA:** A Certification Authority whose Certificate is signed by the Root CA, or another Subordinate CA.

**Subscriber:** A natural person or Legal Entity to whom a Certificate is issued and who is legally bound by a Subscriber Agreement or Terms of Use.

**Subscriber Agreement:** An agreement between the CA and the Applicant/Subscriber that specifies the rights and responsibilities of the parties.

**Subsidiary Company:** A company that is controlled by a Parent Company.

**Suspect Code:** Code that contains malicious functionality or serious vulnerabilities, including spyware, malware and other code that installs without the user's consent and/or resists its own removal, and code that can be exploited in ways not intended by its designers to compromise the trustworthiness of the Platforms on which it executes.

**Technically Constrained Subordinate CA Certificate:** A Subordinate CA certificate which uses a combination of Extended Key Usage settings and Name Constraint settings to limit the scope within which the Subordinate CA Certificate may issue Subscriber or additional Subordinate CA Certificates.

**Terms of Use:** Provisions regarding the safekeeping and acceptable uses of a Certificate issued in accordance with these Requirements when the Applicant/Subscriber is an Affiliate of the CA or is the CA.

**Timestamp Authority:** A service operated by the CA or a delegated third party for its own code signing certificate users that timestamps data using a certificate chained to a public root, thereby asserting that the data (or the data from which the data were derived via a secure hashing algorithm) existed at the specified time.

**Timestamp Certificate:** A certificate issued to a Timestamp Authority to use to timestamp data.

**Trusted Platform Module:** A microcontroller that stores keys, passwords and digital certificates, usually affixed to the motherboard of a computer, which due to its physical nature makes the information stored there more secure against external software attack or physical theft.

**Trusted Role:** Those individuals who perform a security role that is critical to the operation or integrity of a PKI.

**Trustworthy System:** Computer hardware, software, and procedures that are: reasonably secure from intrusion and misuse; provide a reasonable level of availability, reliability, and correct operation; are reasonably suited to performing their intended functions; and enforce the applicable security policy.

**UAE PASS:** The UAE national digital identity for citizens and residents, and visitors enabling them to access many online services across various sectors, sign and authenticate documents as well as transactions digitally, request a digital version of their official documents, and use the official documents to request services from service providers.

**Valid Certificate:** A Certificate that passes the validation procedure specified in RFC 5280.

**Validation Specialist:** Someone who performs the information verification duties specified by this CP and the Baseline Requirements.

**Validity Period:** From RFC 5280 (<http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280>): "The period of time from notBefore through notAfter, inclusive."

**Verifying Person:** A notary, attorney, Latin notary, accountant, individual designated by a government agency as authorized to verify identities, or agent of the CA, who attests to the identity of an individual.

## 1.6.2 Acronyms

**CA** — Certification Authority

**CCTV** — Closed circuit TV

**CP** — Certificate Policy

**CPS** — Certification Practice Statement

**CRL** — Certificate Revocation List

**DRP** — Disaster Recovery Plan

**DN** — Distinguished Name

**FIPS** — Federal Information Processing Standards

**FQDN** — Fully Qualified Domain Name

**HSM** — Hardware Security Module

**HTTP** — Hyper Text Transfer Protocol

**HVAC** — Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning

**IEC** — International Electro-technical Commission

**IETF** — Internet Engineering Task Force

**IPSEC** — Internet Protocol Security

**ISO** — International Standards Organization

**ITU** — International Telecommunications Union

**LDAP** — Lightweight Directory Access Protocol, a common standard for accessing directories

**DESC** — Dubai Electronics Security Center

**OID** — Object Identifier

**OSCP** — Online Certificate Status Protocol

**OTP** — One Time Password

**PA** — Policy Authority of Dubai PKI

**PIN** — A Personal Identification Number or password used to protect the private information and keys on hardware tokens

**PKCS # 1** — Public-Key Cryptography Standards (PKCS) #1

**PKCS # 7** — Cryptographic Message Syntax

**PKCS #10** — Certification Request Syntax Specification

**PKCS #12** — Personal Information Exchange Syntax published by RSA Security

**PKE** — Public Key Encryption

**PKI** — Public Key Infrastructure

**PKIX-CMP** — Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure — Certificate Management Protocol.

**RA** — Registration Authority

**RSA** — The acronym for the inventors of the RSA algorithm; Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman

**SCEP** — Simple Certificate Enrolment Protocol

**Secret Shares** — A set of devices, smart cards, PINs, etc. used with MoN control

**SHA** — Secure Hash Algorithm

**S/MIME** — Secure Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions

**SSL/TLS** — Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security

**SubjectAltName** — A certificate extension that contains FQDNs or authenticated domains or email addresses that are under the control of the Subscriber

**UPS** — Uninterruptible Power Supply

**URI** — Universal Resource Identifier, a URL, FTP address, email address, etc.

**X.501** — A common standard for directory entry naming (ITU)

**X.509** — A public key certificate specification originally developed as part of the X.500 directory specification, often used in public key systems; It is now governed by IETF standards

# 2. Publication and Repository Responsibility

## 2.1 Repositories

DESC publishes information about all digital certificates it issues in (an) online publicly accessible Certificate Dissemination Webpage at <https://ca-repository.desc.gov.ae/>.

## 2.2 Publication of Certificate Information

In particular, DESC publishes a copy of the subordinate CA certificates, OCSP certificates and TSA certificates at this location. This Certificate Policy is updated at the least, annually. DESC reserves its rights to publish certificate status information on third-party repositories.

DESC retains an online repository of documents where it makes certain disclosures about the practices, procedures and content of certain of its policies, including the present CP. It reserves its right to make available and publish information on its policies by any means it sees fit.

DESC shall publish digital certificate status information in frequent intervals as indicated in this CP. The provision of DESC Subordinate CAs issued electronic certificate validity status information is a 24/7 available service.

## 2.3 Time or Frequency of Publication Repositories

Modified versions of this CP and other published documents are published within five days maximum after the Dubai PKI PA approval.

Due to their sensitivity, DESC refrains from making publicly available certain subcomponents and elements of such documents including certain security controls, procedures related with the functioning of registration authorities, internal security polices, etc. Such documents and documented practices are, however, conditionally available to designated authorized parties in the context of audit(s) that DESC owes duty to with regard to DESC Subordinate CAs activities.

### 2.3.1 Certificates

DESC Subordinate CAs, TSA and OCSP certificates shall be published to the public repository (<https://ca-repository.desc.gov.ae/>) once they are issued.

### 2.3.2 CRLs

DESC publishes CRLs at regular intervals. DESC adds a pointer (URL) to the relevant CRL to subscribers' certificates as part of the CDP extension whenever this extension is present.

DESC maintains the Certificate Dissemination Webpage, the CRL distribution point and the information on this URL for a minimum of seven years after the expiration date of all certificates, containing the CRL

distribution point. Approved versions of documents to be published on the repository are uploaded within 24 hours.

For CRLs signed by the CA signing keys stored on online HSMs, CRLs shall be published at predefined intervals in accordance with the following rules:

- At the minimum, CRLs shall be refreshed every 26 hours, even if no changes have occurred since the last issuance.
- CRLs lifetime shall be set to 72 hours.

For CRLs signed by the CA signing keys stored on offline HSMs, CRLs shall be published at predefined intervals in accordance with the following rules:

- At minimum, once every six months, at an agreed time. In addition, a new CRL will be generated and published following the revocation of any certificate,
- CRLs lifetime shall be set to six months

## 2.4 Access Controls on Repositories

Public read-only access to the CP, CPS, certificates, CRLs and documentation published to the repository shall be available.

Access controls shall be implemented on the repository to prevent any unauthorized addition or modification of any published data.

# 3. Identification and Authentication

## 3.1 Naming

### 3.1.1 Types of Names

The certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs shall contain X.500 Distinguished Names (DNs) in English. The table below summarizes the DNs of the certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs.

Certification Authority	Distinguished name
<b>Corporate CA</b>  CA DN: cn = Corporate Certification Authority, o = UAE Government, c = AE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><b>Certificates issued for Government entities through DESC RA:</b>  cn=&lt;Government entity name&gt;, ou = &lt;optional organizational unit within the government entity&gt;, o =&lt;Government entity meaningful unique name&gt;, l =&lt;Government entity locality information&gt;, c = AE</li><li><b>Certificates issued for individuals:</b>  serialnumber=&lt;optional serial number for each subscriber&gt;, cn=&lt;individual end user name&gt;, ou = &lt;optional organizational unit within the government entity&gt;, o =&lt;Government entity meaningful unique name&gt;, l =&lt;Government entity locality information&gt;, c = AE</li><li><b>Signature verification service</b> — The DN format is:  cn = Dubai PKI Signature Verification Service o = DESC l = Dubai c = AE</li><li><b>OCSP responder:</b>  cn = Corporate Certification Authority OCSP, o = DESC, l = Dubai, c = AE</li></ul>
<b>Devices CA</b>  CA DN: cn=Devices Certification Authority, o=UAE Government, c=AE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li><b>OCSP responder</b> — The DN format is:  cn = Devices Certification Authority OCSP o = DESC l = Dubai c = AE</li></ul>

<p><b>Code Signing CA</b></p> <p>CA DN:</p> <p>cn=Code Signing Certification Authority, o=UAE Government, c=AE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Code Signing</b> — The DN format is:           <p>cn = &lt;Government entity name&gt;, organizationIdentifier = &lt;whenever available, a specific Registration Identifier assigned to the Applicant by a government agency&gt;, ou = &lt;optional organizational unit within the government entity&gt;, o = &lt;Government entity meaningful unique name&gt;, l = &lt;Government entity locality information&gt;, c = AE</p> </li> <li>• <b>OCSP responder:</b> cn = Code Signing Certification Authority OCSP, o = DESC, l = Dubai, c = AE</li> </ul>
<p><b>Timestamping CA</b></p> <p>CA DN:</p> <p>cn= Timestamping Certification Authority, o=UAE Government, c=AE</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Dubai TSA</b> — The DN format is:           <p>cn = Dubai Timestamping Authority o = DESC l = Dubai, c = AE</p> </li> <li>• <b>OCSP responder:</b> cn = Timestamping Certification Authority OCSP, o = DESC, l = Dubai, c = AE</li> </ul>
<p><b>Ethaq Plus CA</b></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• <b>Certificates issued for legal persons through DESC RA (eSeal):</b> cn=&lt;entity name&gt;, ou = &lt;optional organizational unit within the entity&gt;, o = &lt;entity meaningful unique name&gt;, l = &lt;entity locality information&gt; , c = AE</li> <li>• <b>Certificates issued for individuals:</b> serialnumber=&lt;optional serial number for each subscriber&gt;, cn=&lt;individual end user name&gt;, ou = &lt;optional organizational unit within the entity&gt;, o = &lt;entity meaningful unique name&gt;, l = &lt;entity locality information&gt;, c = AE</li> <li>• <b>OCSP responder:</b> cn = Ethaq Plus Certification Authority OCSP, o = DESC, l = Dubai, c = AE</li> </ul>

### 3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

Certification Authority	Meaningful Names
Corporate CA	For certificates issued to individuals, names are meaningful since the CN contains the name of the subscriber.

	For certificates issued to government entities, names are meaningful since the CN contains the name of the entity.
Devices CA	Starting 5th October 2023, this CA is not going to issue end-entity certificates. However the CA services will be kept running to only maintain validation information and support revocation of time stamping certificates issued on and before 5 May 2021.
Code Signing CA	Names are meaningful since the CN contains the name of the Government entity.
Timestamping CA	Names are meaningful since the CN contains the name of the Timestamping authority service.
Ethaq Plus CA	For certificates issued to natural persons, names are meaningful since the CN contains the name of the subscriber. For certificates issued to legal persons, names are meaningful since the CN contains the name of the entity.

OCSP and Signature Verification Service, certificates names shall indicate the service name operated by DESC.

### 3.1.3 Anonymity and Pseudonymity of Subscribers

This policy does not permit anonymous subscribers.

### 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms

The naming convention used by Dubai PKI is ISO/IEC 9595 (X.500) Distinguished Name (DN).

### 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names

DESC shall enforce the controls necessary to guarantee that subject Distinguished Name (DN) are unique. The table below summarizes the minimum controls enforced for each CA.

Certification Authority	Distinguished Name
<b>Corporate CA</b>	DESC shall enforce a convention for a meaningful representation uniquely identifying the individual or the Government entity to which the certificate issued. For certificates issued for Corporate CA OCSP responder and the Signature Verification Service: a service unique name shall be included in the subject DN to ensure uniqueness.
<b>Devices CA</b>	Starting 5th October 2023, this CA is not going to issue end-entity certificates. However the CA services will be kept running to only maintain validation information and support revocation of time stamping certificates issued on and before 5 May 2021.
<b>Code Signing CA</b>	DESC shall enforce a convention for a meaningful representation uniquely identifying the Government entity to which the certificate issued.

	For certificates issued for the Code Signing CA OCSP responder: a service unique name shall be included in the subject DN to ensure uniqueness.
<b>Timestamping CA</b>	A unique name of the Timestamping authority service shall be included in the subject DN to ensure uniqueness.  For certificates issued for the Timestamping CA OCSP responder: a service unique name shall be included in the subject DN to ensure uniqueness.
<b>Ethaq Plus CA</b>	DESC shall enforce a convention for a meaningful representation uniquely identifying the natural or legal person to which the certificate issued.  For certificates issued for the Ethaq Plus CA OCSP responder: a service unique name shall be included in the subject DN to ensure uniqueness.

### **3.1.6 Recognition, authentication and role of Trademarks**

Certificate applicants are prohibited from using names in their certificate application that infringe upon the Intellectual Property Rights of others. DESC Subordinate CAs do not verify whether a certificate applicant has Intellectual Property Rights in the name appearing in a certificate application.

DESC Subordinate CAs shall have the right to revoke a Certificate upon receipt of a properly authenticated order from DESC or court of competent jurisdiction requiring the revocation of a Certificate or Certificates containing a Subject name in dispute.

## **3.2 Initial Identity Validation**

### **3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession of Private Key**

DESC Subordinate CAs shall verify that the certificate applicant possesses the private key corresponding to the public key being certified by performing signature verification on the certificate request received. The CAs shall always expect the certificate request to be signed by the private key associated to the public key being certified.

### **3.2.2 Authentication of Organization and Domain Identity**

#### **3.2.2.1 Identity**

For certificates containing organization information, the identity and related information of the organization shall be verified through a reliable data source that allows the RA to verify at least the legal name, legal representatives (e.g. the UAE Official Gazette).

In summary, the validation of Organization identity consists in two parts:

##### **A. Presence / Legal standing**

- Verify the existence of the Organization using an authoritative source that is expected to provide detailed information about the entity including its legal name and address,
- Verify authority of the Organization's authorized representative requesting the certificate. The requestor shall be an authorized representative from the entity.

## B. Association

The organization name to be inserted in the requested certificate must exactly match the legal name of the entity requesting the certificate unless there is an authentic proof linking the entity with the name to be included in the certificate.

### 3.2.2.2 DBA/Tradename

The use of DBA or Tradename in the Subject Identity Information is not supported by DESC Subordinate CAs.

### 3.2.2.3 Validation of Domain Authorization or Control

No stipulation — The Dubai PKI doesn't support certificates used for Server Authentication.

### 3.2.2.4 Authentication for an IP Address

No stipulation — The Dubai PKI doesn't support certificates used for Server Authentication.

### 3.2.2.5 Wildcard Domain Validation

No stipulation — The Dubai PKI doesn't support certificates used for Server Authentication.

### 3.2.2.6 Data Source Accuracy

The Ras shall document the processes followed to check the accuracy of information and documents received as part of the certificate enrolment process.

### 3.2.2.7 CAA records

No stipulation — The Dubai PKI doesn't support certificates used for Server Authentication.

## 3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

The table below describes the rules that apply for authentication of certificate applicants:

Certification Authority	Method of authentication of individual identity
Corporate CA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Certificates application through a government entity LRA officer (or DESC RA officer):</b> The subscriber's identity validation shall be performed by the RA/LRA officer according to the government entity's applicable business rules. The Government entity shall ensure that the diligence and rigor of validation is based on face-to-face identity validation or equal to the face-to-face identity verification involving the presentation of a government issued ID card (e.g. Emirates ID).</li><li>• <b>Certificates application through the UAE PASS system:</b> Applicants enrolled through the UAE PASS are validated as follows:<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>○ For the Authentication certificate and digital signature certificate for “<b>High assurance</b>” transactions: Identity validation shall be performed using one of the following methods:</li></ul></li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ within a controlled environment (e.g. through dedicated kiosk), involving a government issued ID and biometric verification or through use of and approved technology that can verify user through use of biometric information (e.g. fingerprint or face verification)</li> <li>▪ Face verification using a live photo captured by the UAE PASS against MoI biometrics database. The photo capture software shall implement adequate controls against common presentation attacks (i.e., Liveness check)</li> <li>○ For signing certificates for “<b>Moderate assurance</b>” transactions, identity validation can be performed either as mentioned above.</li> </ul>
Devices CA	Starting 5th October 2023, this CA is not going to issue end-entity certificates. However the CA services will be kept running to only maintain validation information and support revocation of time stamping certificates issued on and before 5 May 2021.
Code Signing CA	<p>Identity validation shall be performed using one of the following methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Face-to-face verification against a government issued photo ID</li> <li>○ Remote verification involving a government issued ID and biometric verification,</li> <li>○ Receive a digitally signed certificate from by the requestor using a valid UAE PASS certificate.</li> </ul>
Timestamping CA	<p>Identity validation shall be performed using one of the following methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Face-to-face verification against a government issued photo ID,</li> <li>○ Remote verification involving a government issued ID and biometric verification,</li> <li>○ Receive a digitally signed certificate from by the requestor using a valid UAE PASS certificate.</li> </ul>
Ethaq Plus CA	<p>For certificate for “<b>Moderate assurance</b>” transactions, Identity validation shall be performed using one of the following methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Using trusted KYC database shall fulfil one of the following requirements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Owned and operated by a licensee of the UAE National Bank or an organization operating under the AML (Anti-Money Laundering) regulations</li> <li>○ Existence of ID proofing artifacts substantiate the antecedent verification outcome</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Mechanisms are in place that bind the individual to the asserted identity</li> <li>● Using recorded videos or video calls where person's face is visually verified by an officer against a government issued photo ID</li> <li>● Receive a digitally signed request from by the applicant using a moderate assurance certificate</li> </ul> <p>For certificate for "<b>High assurance</b>" transactions, Identity validation shall be performed using one of the following methods:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Using trusted KYC database shall fulfil one of the following requirements: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>○ Owned and operated by a Government agency that issues a government ID such as passport, driving license, residence/work permit etc.</li> <li>○ Existence of ID proofing artifacts substantiate the antecedent verification outcome</li> <li>○ Mechanisms are in place that bind the individual to the asserted identity</li> </ul> </li> <li>● Conduct an in-person meeting with the individual to complete the identity verification against the government-issued photo ID. During the meeting, the applicant presents his government-issued ID to RA/LRA officer that verifies that full name/date of birth of the individual from the attestation letter matches the full name/date of birth from the ID.</li> <li>● Using UAE PASS authentication</li> <li>● Verification of a biometric previously collected</li> <li>● Receive a digitally signed request from the applicant using a high-assurance certificate. The digital signature will be thoroughly verified to confirm that the certificate is trusted, valid, and that the signature itself is authentic and intact.</li> </ul>
--	--

### 3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information

the Subscriber's information contained within certificate issued by DESC Subordinate CAs shall be verified by the relevant RA/LRA. Non-verified information shall not be included in certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs.

### 3.2.5 Validation of Authority

Certification Authority	Validation of authority
Corporate CA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Government entity certificates to be issued through DESC RA: The authority of the certificate requestor to request a certificate on behalf of a Government entity shall be performed based on authoritative sources (e.g. UAE Official Gazette) or through a reliable means of communication with the Government entity to establish the authority</li> </ul>

	<p>of the applicant to request a certificate on behalf of the Government entity.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Individual certificates to be issued through the LRA (including DESC RA): The RA/LRA officer/system (that is approved by DESC) is authorized to submit certification requests on behalf of the Government Entity subscribers.</li> </ul>
Devices CA	Starting 5th October 2023, this CA is not going to issue end-entity certificates. However the CA services will be kept running to only maintain validation information and support revocation of time stamping certificates issued on and before 5 May 2021.
Code Signing CA	The authority of the certificate requestor to request a certificate on behalf of a Government entity shall be performed based on authoritative sources (e.g. UAE Official Gazette) or through a reliable means of communication with the Government entity to establish the authority of the applicant to request a certificate on behalf of the Government entity.
Timestamping CA	The authority of the certificate requestor to request a certificate on behalf of a Government entity shall be performed based on authoritative sources (e.g. UAE Official Gazette) or through a reliable means of communication with the Government entity to establish the authority of the applicant to request a certificate on behalf of the Government entity.
Ethaq Plus CA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>For certificates issued to legal persons through DESC RA (including LRA certificates): The authority of the certificate requestor to request a certificate on behalf of an organization is performed through a reliable means of communication with the organization.</li> <li>For natural persons certificates to be issued through LRAs: The LRA officer/system (that was previously approved by The Dubai PKI PA) is authorized to submit certification requests on behalf of the LRA's subscribers.</li> </ul>

### 3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

## 3.3 Identification and Authentication for Re-keying requests

### 3.3.1 Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Keying

Identification and authentication steps for Routine Re-Key shall be the same as applied during initial certification. Short-lived certificates are not subject to re-key, such certificates are requested for every signing transaction.

### 3.3.2 Identification and Authentication for Re-Key after revocation

Identification and authentication steps for Routine Re-Key shall be the same as applied during initial certification.

## 3.4 Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests

The relevant RA/LRA shall authenticate all revocation requests that are at the Subscriber's request. The RA/LRA may authenticate revocation requests by referencing the Certificate's Public Key, regardless of whether the associated Private Key is compromised.

OCSP, DESC TSA and Signature Verification Service certificates' revocation shall be conducted as part of DESC internal processes and the Dubai PKI PA shall approve it.

# 4. Certificate Life Cycle Management

## 4.1 Certificate Application

### 4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

- **Certificates for entities issued through DESC RA:** An authorized representative\requester from the entity submits the certificate application as part of the certificate issuance process.
- **Certificates for individuals issued through the LRA (including DESC RA):** The LRA or DESC RA submits the certificate application.
- **Certificates for individuals issued through the UAE PASS:** The UAE PASS system is the interface through which certificate applications are triggered to the CA.
- **For certificates issued to OCSP, DESC TSA service and signature verification service:** An authorized administrator can submit a certificate request.

### 4.1.2 Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

For any certificate issued by DESC Subordinate CAs, the certificate applicant shall ratify to the terms and conditions of DESC subscriber agreement .

For further details on the enrollment process, please refer to the applicable CPS.

## 4.2 Certificate Application Processing

### 4.2.1 Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

Refer to section 3.2 of this CP. In addition, the following requirements shall also apply:

Certification Authority	Acceptance/rejection of certificate applications
General requirements for all certificate applications	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Blacklist check according to the RA's own blacklist</li><li>• Verify the association between the certificate requester and the applicant (in case the applicant is not applying for the certificate himself/herself)</li></ul>
For certificates issued to legal persons	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Establish the entity existence based on a trusted authoritative source</li><li>• Verify the association between the authorized representative and the entity based on a trusted authoritative source or a formal communication with the entity's HR.</li></ul>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Verify the association between the certificate requester and the entity based on a proof of employment or a formal communication with the entity's HR.</li> </ul> <p>For Code Signing certificates, the use of the documents and data provided to verify certificate information in accordance to section 3.2 shall be valid for a period no more than a specific period, prior to issuing the Certificate. This specific period shall not be more than the maximum validity period of the Code Signing certificate. Any issuance exceeding such period, shall rely on new validation evidence as specified in section 3.2.</p>
For certificates issued to a natural person	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Identify the person (as described in section 3.2.2)</li> </ul> <p>For certificates issued to a natural person with association to a legal person: Verify the association between the applicant and the organization (legal person) based on a proof of employment or a formal communication with the organization's HR.</p>
For certificates issued to a non-natural person	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Verify that the organization field of the subject DN value (from CSR) matches the name of the entity</li> <li>Verify the association between the IT system or device for which the certificate is requested and the entity.</li> </ul>

For further details, please refer to the applicable CPS.

#### 4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications

Approval of certificate applications is subject to the results of the identification and authentication described under section 4.2.1.

Refer to the applicable CPS for further details and conditions.

#### 4.2.3 Time to Process Certificate Applications

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

### 4.3 Certificate Issuance

DESC Subordinate CAs shall process a certificate issuance request as follows:

- Verify that the certificate request originated from a valid (L)RA
- Issue the required digital certificates that contain the information provided in the certificate request
- If applicable, publish the issued certificates on the DESC public repository

For further details, please refer to the applicable CPS.

#### 4.3.1 CA Actions during Certificate Issuance

Refer to the applicable CPS.

### **4.3.2 Notification to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate**

Refer to the applicable CPS.

## **4.4 Certificate Acceptance**

### **4.4.1 Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

It shall be possible for the applicant to verify that the issued certificates contain the required data. For further details, please refer to the applicable CPS.

OCSP, DESC TSA and Signature Verification Service certificates shall be accepted as part of DESC internal processes and the Dubai PKI PA shall approve it.

### **4.4.2 Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

The CA, DESC TSA and OCSP certificates shall be published on the dissemination page as described in section 2.2.

### **4.4.3 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

## **4.5 Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

### **4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage**

In using a subscriber's private keys and corresponding certificates, a subscriber shall adhere to the following obligations:

- Use certificates only for their intended usage as per this CP and the related CPS
- Discontinue using a private key following expiration or revocation of the corresponding certificate
- Notify the CA or RA in the event of private key compromise.

### **4.5.2 Relying on Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

When using a subscriber's public key and corresponding certificate, a relying party shall adhere to the following obligations:

- Ensure that the key is appropriate for the intended use as set forth in this CP and the applicable CPS. Such use shall be consistent with the applicable certificate content including, but not limited to, the key usage, extended key usage and certificate policies extension fields
- Check the status of the certificate against the appropriate and current CRLs or through the OCSP service offered by DESC Subordinate CAs.

## **4.6 Certificate Renewal**

Certificate Renewal is the act of issuing a new certificate when all the identifying information and the public key from the old certificate are duplicated in the new certificate, but there is a different (longer) validity period.

Certificate Renewal shall not be supported. Only certificate re-key is supported.

## 4.7 Certificate Re-key

Certificate Re-key involves re-issuing a certificate for an existing subscriber such that identifying information from the old certificate is duplicated in the new certificate, with a different public key and validity period.

Re-key is an operation supported by the provisions of this CP. The re-key process (including identity validation, issuance) shall be similar to the initial certification.

Short-lived certificates are not subject to re-key, a new certificate is requested for every signing transaction.

Re-key for OCSP, DESC TSA and Signature Verification Service certificates shall happen as part of internal DESC processes and approved by the Dubai PKI PA.

### 4.7.1 Circumstance for Certificate Re-key

Certificate re-key may happen while the certificate is still active, after it has expired, or after a revocation. The re-key operation shall invalidate any existing active certificates of the same type.

### 4.7.2 Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key

As per initial certificate issuance.

### 4.7.3 Processing Certificate Re-keying Requests

As per initial certificate issuance.

### 4.7.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber

As per initial certificate issuance.

### 4.7.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-keyed Certificate

As per initial certificate issuance.

### 4.7.6 Publication of the Re-keyed Certificate by the CA

As per initial certificate issuance.

### 4.7.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities

As per initial certificate issuance.

## 4.8 Certificate Modification

This CP does not provide provisions for certificate modification outside the context of certificate re-key, which results in the generation of a new certificate with the same identification information. Refer to section 4.7 of this CP for further details.

#### **4.8.1 Circumstance for Certificate Modification**

Not applicable beyond the normal certificate re-key operation

#### **4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate Modification**

Not applicable beyond the normal certificate re-key operation

#### **4.8.3 Processing Certificate Modification Requests**

Not applicable beyond the normal certificate re-key operation

#### **4.8.4 Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

Not applicable beyond the normal certificate re-key operation

#### **4.8.5 Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate**

Not applicable beyond the normal certificate re-key operation

#### **4.8.6 Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA**

Not applicable beyond the normal certificate re-key operation

#### **4.8.7 Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

Not applicable beyond the normal certificate re-key operation

### **4.9 Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

#### **4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation**

End Entity certificates shall be revoked under the circumstances mentioned in the applicable CPS.

This CP does not provide provisions for revoking an OCSP and Signature Verification Service certificates apart from the compromise of the corresponding key pair, which shall be considered by DESC as per its disaster recovery and business continuity procedures.

The following sub-sections focus only on the revocation provisions that apply for end-entity certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs.

#### **4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation**

- A subscriber shall be able to request the revocation for its certificate.
- The (L)RA shall be able to request the revocation for the certificates that they manage.

Only authorized revocation requests shall be accepted.

For further details, please refer to the applicable CPS.

### **4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation Request**

Refer to the applicable CPS.

### **4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace Period**

There shall be no revocation grace period. Revocation requests shall be processed as per schedule or immediately by the (L)RA.

### **4.9.5 Revocation Request Response Time**

Certificate revocation requests and problem reports shall be processed within 24 hours from their reception, problem reports processing may require additional time for investigation and involvement of relevant parties. More details on the procedure and involved parties shall be documented in the applicable CPS.

An interface for revocation shall be enabled for registered LRAs to be used for revocation requests and ensure they are processed immediately.

### **4.9.6 Revocation Checking Requirement for Relying Parties**

Revocation information shall be offered to relying parties through CRLs published on a publicly available web server or through its OCSP responder. Relying parties shall use any of these methods while processing a certificate issued by DESC Subordinate CAs.

### **4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency**

CRLs are issued as per section 2.3 of this CP.

### **4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

### **4.9.9 Online Revocation/Status Checking Availability**

The OCSP responder shall be compliant with RFC 6960. OCSP information shall be available immediately to relying party applications.

The actual OCSP URL to be queried by relying party organizations shall be referenced in the certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs.

### **4.9.10 Online Revocation Checking Requirements**

It is at the discretion of the relying party to decide whether to use CRL or rely on OCSP.

### **4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

### **4.9.12 Special Requirements — Key Compromise**

If DESC discovers, or has a reason to believe, that there has been a compromise of the private key of the Subordinate CAs, DESC will immediately declare a disaster and invoke Dubai PKI business continuity plan. DESC will (1) determine the scope of certificates that must be revoked, (2) publish a

new CRL at the earliest feasible time, (3) use reasonable efforts to notify subscribers and potential relying parties that there has been a key compromise, and (4) generate new CA key pair as per DESC operations policies and procedures.

#### **4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension**

Certificate suspension is not supported by DESC Subordinate CAs.

#### **4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension**

Not applicable

#### **4.9.15 Procedure for Suspension Request**

Not applicable

### **4.10 Certificate Status Services**

Refer to section 4.9.6 of this CP.

#### **4.10.1 Operational Characteristics**

CRLs shall be published by DESC Subordinate CAs on a public repository which is available to relying parties through HTTP protocol queries.

The OCSP responders shall expose an HTTP interface accessible to relying parties.

#### **4.10.2 Service Availability**

The repository, including the latest CRL, should be available 24X7 for at least 99% of the time.

#### **4.10.3 Optional Features**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

### **4.11 End of Subscription**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

### **4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery**

#### **4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices**

Key escrow is not supported by DESC Subordinate CAs.

#### **4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

# 5. Facility, Management and operational Controls

## 5.1 Physical Controls

### 5.1.1 Site Location and Construction

All critical components of the PKI solution are housed within a highly secure enclave Data Center. Physical access controls are in place to protect the infrastructure, management systems and related operational activities of the PKI solution.

### 5.1.2 Physical Access

Physical security controls include security guard-controlled building access, biometric access, and Closed-Circuit TV (CCTV) monitoring. These physical controls protect the hardware and software from unauthorized access, furthermore these controls are monitored on a 24x7x365 basis.

The Dubai PKI systems are protected by six tiers of physical security, with access to the lower tier required before gaining access to the higher most restrictive tier. Sensitive CA operational activities related to the lifecycle of the certification process such as authentication, verification, and issuance, occur within very restrictive physical tiers. Physical access is enforced through the use of two factor biometric authentication. Further, access to the enclave where the Dubai PKI systems are hosted shall be enabled only if two trusted employees are present to open the enclave's door.

Unauthorized personnel, including un-trusted or third-party employees or visitors, are not allowed into such secured areas without a prior approval and without an escort from one of trusted employees. Similar restrictions exist for the Disaster Recovery site.

All the Networking and systems components including the certification components are located in secure Data cabinets with locks from both sides. To prevent tampering, cryptographic hardware is stored in the most secure area, with access limited to authorized personnel.

### 5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning

The secure enclave shall be furnished with a UPS, and heating ventilating and air conditioning (HVAC) sufficient to maintain the computer equipment within the manufacturers' recommended range of operating temperatures and humidity.

### 5.1.4 Water Exposures

The PKI solution shall be installed in such a way that it is not in danger of exposure to water.

### 5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection

The secure enclave shall be protected from fire and heat by smoke detection equipment that is monitored on a 24x7x365 basis. Fire suppression equipment shall be installed within the enclave.

### **5.1.6 Media Storage**

Electronic optical and other media shall be stored so that they are protected from accidental damage (water, fire, electromagnetic radiation). Media that contains audit archives and backup information shall be stored in a secure fire-proof safe while it is stored within the enclave.

### **5.1.7 Waste Disposal**

All obsolete paper, magnetic media, optical media, etc., created within the enclave shall be shredded before discarding. Reusable magnetic and optical media may be reused indefinitely within the enclave but must be properly wiped and/or destroyed depending on the confidentiality of the data stored on the medium.

### **5.1.8 Offsite Backup**

System backups must provide sufficient recovery information to allow the recovery from system failure(s). Backups shall be made on a daily basis and copies shall be transferred to a secure offsite location on a periodic basis.

Facilities used for offsite backup and archives shall have the same level of security as the DESC's main site.

## **5.2 Procedural Controls**

DESC follows personnel and management practices that provide reasonable assurance of the trustworthiness and competence of the members of the staff and of the satisfactory performance of their duties in the fields of electronic signature-related technologies.

DESC obtains a signed statement from each member of the staff concerned on not having conflicting interests with DESC Subordinate CAs' activities, maintaining confidentiality and protecting personal data.

### **5.2.1 Trusted Roles**

All members of the staff operating the key management operations, administrators, security officers, and system auditors or any other operations that materially affect such operations are considered as serving in a trusted position (i.e., trusted operatives).

DESC conducts an initial investigation of all members of staff who are candidates, to serve in trusted roles to make due diligence attempt to determine their trustworthiness and competence. Trusted roles individuals shall go through an annual background checks.

### **5.2.2 Number of Persons Required Per Task**

DESC shall maintain and enforces rigorous control procedures to ensure the segregation of duties, based on job responsibility, in order to prevent single trusted personnel to perform sensitive operations.

The most sensitive tasks, such as access to and management of CA cryptographic hardware security module (HSM) shall require the involvement of two or more persons.

### **5.2.3 Identification and Authentication for Each Role**

Before exercising the responsibilities of a trusted role:

- DESC shall confirm the identity of the employee by carrying out background checks.
- DESC shall issue access credentials to the individual who needs to access equipment located in the secure enclave.
- DESC shall provide the required dedicated credentials that allow designated individuals to conduct their functions.

#### **5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation of Duties**

DESC ensures separation among the following discreet work groups to ensure no one individual can complete any of critical transactions such as revocation of Subordinate CA certificate:

- Personnel that manages operations on certificates
- Administrative personnel to operate the supporting platform
- Security personnel to enforce security measures

### **5.3 Personnel Controls**

DESC ensures implementation of security controls with regard to the duties and performance of the members of its staff with regards to the DESC Subordinate CAs' activities. These security controls are documented in an internal confidential policy and include the areas below.

#### **5.3.1 Qualifications Experience and Clearance Requirements**

Prior to the commencement of employment of a DESC PKI personnel, whether as an employee, agent, or an independent contractor, DESC shall verify the background, qualifications and experience needed to perform within the competence context of the specific job. Detailed checks shall be detailed in the CPS.

#### **5.3.2 Background Check Procedures**

DESC conducts background investigations for all DESC PKI personnel, contractors, trusted roles and management positions. Additionally, DESC PKI staff who have Trusted roles go through an annual background check to ensure continuous trustworthiness of those employees

#### **5.3.3 Training Requirements**

DESC makes available relevant technical training for their personnel to perform their functions.

For personnel performing information verification and vetting (i.e., RA officers), public key infrastructure topics, authentication and vetting policies and procedures, applicable CP and CPS material and common threats to the information verification process are included.

The required skills and knowledge for validation specialists shall be tested through an examination on the information verification requirements.

#### **5.3.4 Retraining Frequency and Requirements**

Periodic training will be carried out to maintain skills and knowledge levels, and to update the training topics and related procedures.

### **5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence**

DESC shall establish a job rotation schedule for its team staff, consistent with the need to provide continuity of the PKI service and avoid dependency on key staff members.

### **5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized Actions**

DESC sanctions personnel for unauthorized actions, unauthorized use of authority and unauthorized use of systems for the purpose of imposing accountability on the Dubai PKI personnel, as it might be appropriate under the circumstances, and as per the prevailing HR policy and the applicable Dubai law.

### **5.3.7 Independent Contractor Requirements**

Independent subcontractors and their personnel are subject to the same background checks as DESC employees. The background checks include:

- Criminal convictions for serious crimes
- Misrepresentations by the candidate
- Appropriateness of references
- Any clearances as deemed appropriate
- Privacy protection
- Confidentiality conditions

### **5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to Personnel**

DESC makes available documentation to personnel, during initial training and retraining.

## **5.4 Audit Logging Procedures**

For details on the audit logging procedures, refer to the applicable CPS. The following provisions are made in this CP.

### **5.4.1 Types of Event Recorded**

Following events occurring on DESC Subordinate CAs shall be recorded:

- CA key life cycle management events, including:
  - Key generation, backup, storage, recovery, archival and destruction
  - Cryptographic device life cycle management events
- CA and Subscriber Certificate life cycle management events, including:
  - Introduction of new Certificate Profiles and retirement of existing Certificate Profiles,
  - Certificate requests, re-key requests, and revocation
  - All verification activities stipulated in these requirements and the CA's Certification Practice Statement
  - Date, time, phone number used, persons spoken to, and end results of verification telephone calls

- Acceptance and rejection of certificate requests
- Issuance of Certificates
- Generation of Certificate Revocation Lists and OCSP entries
- Security events, including:
  - Successful and unsuccessful PKI system access attempts
  - PKI and security system actions performed
  - Security profile changes
  - System crashes, hardware failures and other anomalies
  - Firewall and router activities
  - Entries to and exits from the CA facility

In addition, DESC maintains internal logs and audit trails of relevant operational events in the infrastructure, including, but not limited to:

- Start and stop of servers
- Outages and major problems
- Physical access of personnel and other persons to sensitive parts of the DESC site
- Backup and restore
- Report of disaster recovery tests
- Audit inspections
- Upgrades and changes to systems, software and infrastructure
- Security intrusions and attempts at intrusion
- Other documents that are required for audits include:
  - Infrastructure plans and descriptions
  - Physical site plans and descriptions
  - Configuration of hardware and software
  - Personnel access control lists

#### **5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log**

DESC ensures that the designated personnel reviews log files at regular intervals in order to validate log integrity and ensure timely identification of anomalous events.

Designated personnel/auditors shall report and perform follow-up of these events and any issues affecting audit log integrity.

#### **5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit Log**

The audit logs are retained for at least two years, refer to the applicable CPS for more details about log retention criteria.

#### **5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log**

Audit logs shall be protected by a combination of physical and procedural security controls.

#### **5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures**

The following rules apply for the backup of DESC Subordinate CAs audit log:

- Backup media shall be stored locally in DESC's main site in a secure location.
- A second copy of the audit log data and files shall be stored outside DESC's main site, in a site that provides similar physical and environmental security as the main site.

#### **5.4.6 Audit Collection System (internal vs. external)**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

#### **5.4.7 Notification to Event-causing Subject**

Where an event is logged by the audit collection system, no notice is required to be given to the individual, organization, device or application that caused the event.

#### **5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments**

The security Dubai PKI PA Information Security function conducts an annual assessment in line with the information security policy and this CP.

The Dubai PKI systems are subject to regular vulnerability assessment and penetration testing covering the Dubai PKI systems.

### **5.5 Records Archival**

#### **5.5.1 Types of Records Archived**

DESC shall archive the audit logs set forth in Section 5.4.1, in addition to the following:

1. Documentation related to the security of their Certificate Systems, Certificate Management Systems, and Root CA Systems; and
2. Documentation related to their verification, issuance, and revocation of certificate requests and Certificates.

#### **5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive**

DESC shall retain audit logs (as set forth in Section 5.4.1) and records (as set forth in Section 5.5.1) for 7 years after any certificate based on that documentation/logs ceases to be valid.

#### **5.5.3 Protection of Archive**

Only the records administrator (member of staff assigned with the records retention duty) may access an archive. Measures are taken to ensure:

- Protection against modification of archive, such as storing the data on a write once medium
- Protection against deletion of archive

- Protection against deterioration and/or obsolescence of the media on which the archive is stored, such as a requirement for data to be migrated periodically to unused media

#### **5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures**

DESC shall document backup, restore and archive procedures that document how the archive information is created, transmitted and stored.

#### **5.5.5 Requirements for timestamping of Records**

All recorded events include the date and time of when the event took place, based on the time of the operating system. Procedures are in place to ensure that all systems rely on and are synchronized with a trusted time source.

#### **5.5.6 Archive Collection System (internal or external)**

Only authorized and authenticated staff shall be allowed to handle archived material.

#### **5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information**

Only DESC staff members with a clear hierarchical control and a definite job description may obtain and verify archived information. DESC retains records in electronic or paper-based format.

### **5.6 Key Changeover**

To minimize impact of key compromise, DESC Subordinate CA private keys are periodically changed over.

To support revocation management of issued certificate, the old CA private keys shall be maintained until such time as all relying certificates have expired.

## **5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery**

#### **5.7.1 Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures**

In a separate internal document, DESC shall specify applicable incident, compromise reporting and handling procedures. DESC shall specify the recovery procedures used when computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted or suspected of being corrupted.

#### **5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software and/or Data Corruption**

All Dubai PKI Participants (other than Subscribers and Relying Parties) establish the necessary measures to ensure full recovery of DESC Subordinate CAs services in case of a disaster, and corrupted servers, software or data.

DESC shall establish:

- Disaster recovery resources in a location sufficiently distant from the regular DESC Subordinate CAs operation facility
- Fast communications between the two sites to ensure data integrity

Disaster recovery infrastructure and procedures shall be fully tested at least once a year more than one member of the Dubai PKI PA as the witness.

### **5.7.3 Entity Private Key Compromise Procedures**

For Subscribers key compromise, see section 4.9 of the present CP.

In the event of a key compromise for any of DESC Subordinate CAs, or of the associated activation data, DESC PKI team triggers the Key compromise and CA termination plans detailed as part of DESC Business continuity and disaster recovery plan.

As part of the Key compromise and CA termination plan, the Dubai PKI PA shall be invited for an emergency meeting to take decisions and handle communications as required with law enforcement authorities and other relevant stakeholders such as Root Programs and Relying Parties.

### **5.7.4 Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster**

DESC shall establish the necessary measures to full and automatic recovery of the online services such as the OCSP and the public repository hosting CRLs in case of a disaster, in addition to corrupted servers, software or data.

DESC shall establish the necessary measures to ensure full recovery of the offline services service in case of a disaster, and corrupted servers, software or data.

A Business Continuity Plan has been implemented to ensure business continuity following a natural or other disaster and is available as a separate internal document. The business continuity plan includes the following:

1. Conditions for activating the plan
2. Emergency procedures
3. Fallback procedures
4. Resumption procedures
5. Maintenance schedule for the plan
6. Awareness and education requirements
7. The responsibilities of the individuals
8. Recovery time objective (RTO)
9. Regular testing of contingency plans
10. The plan to maintain or restore the business operations in a timely manner following interruption to or failure of critical business processes
11. A requirement to store critical cryptographic materials (i.e., secure cryptographic device and activation materials) at an alternate location
12. What constitutes an acceptable system outage and recovery time
13. How frequently backup copies of essential business information and software are taken
14. The distance of recovery facilities to the main site
15. Procedures for securing its facility to the extent possible during the period of time following a disaster and prior to restoring a secure environment either at the original or a remote site

## **5.8 CA or RA Termination**

If DESC determines that termination of this CA services are deemed necessary, the CA termination plan shall be executed and it shall cover the following actions:

1. Minimize disruption caused by the termination of an Issuing CA is minimized as much as possible
2. ensure continued maintenance of records required to provide evidence of certification for the purposes of legal proceedings. The retention of archived data specified in Section 5.5
3. ensure Certificate status information services are maintained for the applicable period
4. notify subscribers, relying parties and other stakeholders (e.g. auditors and the browsers' root programs). Notification procedures shall exist for informing affected entities and transferring archived CA records to an appropriate custodian
5. terminate all authorization of sub-contractors to act on behalf of the terminated service (DESC Subordinate CAs or its RAs) in the performance of any functions related to the process of issuing certificates.

If an LRA decides to terminate operations, the Agreement between Dubai PKI and the LRA shall set forth what actions are to be taken to ensure continued support for certificates previously issued by the Subordinate CAs. Upon termination of the RA Agreement, the RA certificate shall be revoked, and Dubai PKI will be the custodian of LRA archival records in case of termination.

# 6. Technical Security Controls

## 6.1 Key Pair Generation and Installation

The requirements for key generation and delivery are stated in the following sections .

### 6.1.1 Key Pair Generation

#### 6.1.1.1 CA Key Pair Generation

The Subordinate CAs keys shall be generated as part of a key ceremony produced by the PA and executed under the supervision of the PA.

CA key pairs shall be generated within the memory of an HSM certified to the level required by this CA operation (at minimum FIPS 140-2 Level 3).

DESC shall ensure the implementation and documentation of key generation procedures in line with this CP. It acknowledges public, international and WebTrust and CA/Browser Forum Guidelines on trustworthy systems, incorporating the following requirements:

- The key generation ceremony is subject to the formal authorization of the Dubai PKI PA
- The key generation ceremony is conducted in presence of a combination of authorized personnel with trusted roles including the Dubai PKI PA representatives
- The key Generation Ceremony is witnessed by DESC internal auditor
- DESC ensures the distribution of the tokens giving access to the private key(s) to the trusted operatives and key custodians
- DESC internal auditor then issues a report, covering that the CA, during its Key Pair and Certificate generation process:
  - Documented its key generation and protection procedures in its Certificate Policy, and its Certification Practices Statement
  - Included appropriate detail in its Key Generation Script
  - Maintained effective controls to provide reasonable assurance that the key pair was generated and protected in conformity with the procedures described in its CP/CPS and with its Key Generation Script
  - Performed, during the key generation process, all the procedures required by its Key Generation Script
- A video of the entire key generation ceremony will be recorded and stored securely for auditing purposes.

### **6.1.1.2 Subscriber Key Pair Generation**

Subscriber key generation is not performed for DESC Subordinate CAs. Subscribers must generate their keys in a manner that is appropriate for the certificate type as specified in the CPS.

### **6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Subscriber**

Not applicable.

### **6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer**

Public keys shall be delivered to subscribers through the use of delivery processes (e.g. PKCS#10 through email or media exchange) and key management protocols (e.g., XKMS, PKIX CMP, SCEP, ...).

### **6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties**

The CA should make its certificates available to subscribers and relying parties by publishing them in a public repository (<https://ca-repository.desc.gov.ae/>).

### **6.1.5 Key Sizes**

The DESC Subordinate CAs' key pair shall be at least 4096-bit RSA.

Subscriber keys shall be at least 2048-bit RSA, recommended 4096-bit RSA or at least 256-bit ECDSA, recommended 384-bit ECDSA.

### **6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking**

#### **6.1.6.1 CA Keys**

DESC Subordinate CAs shall rely on off-the-shelf implementation of key PKI functionality including public key parameters generations.

#### **6.1.6.2 Subscriber Keys**

DESC Subordinate CAs shall use reasonable techniques to validate the suitability of public keys presented by Subscribers.

#### **6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)**

Certificates issued by DESC Subordinate CAs should always contain a key usage bit string in accordance with RFC 5280.

## **6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

### **6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls**

DESC shall generate subordinate key pairs and store their private keys within a Cryptographic Device that is certified according to the rating specified in 6.2.11.

The Cryptographic modules used for Subscribers' key generation and storage shall be at least compliant to FIPS 140-2 Level 2.

### **6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control**

DESC shall implement technical and procedural mechanisms that implement the principles of dual control and split knowledge. These principles guarantee the participation of multiple trusted individuals for performing sensitive operations with CAs cryptographic hardware.

### **6.2.3 Private Key Escrow**

Not applicable

### **6.2.4 Private Key Backup**

DESC Subordinate CAs private keys shall be backed up within backup HSMs that meet the same certification level as the Subordinate CA HSM and as described in section 6.2.1.

The creation of key backups on backup HSMs shall be conducted using the principles of dual controls and split knowledge.

At least one backup of the Subordinate CAs keys shall be taken. This backup shall be stored in a locked safe at the disaster recovery site.

### **6.2.5 Private Key Archival**

Not applicable.

### **6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module**

DESC Subordinate CAs key pairs shall only be transferred to another hardware cryptographic device, for backup purposes, of the same specification as described in 6.2.11 by direct token-to-token copy via trusted path under multi-person control. At no time should the CA private key be copied to disk or other media during this operation.

CA Key backups shall be generated with the enforcement of dual control and split knowledge mechanisms. The transfer of the CA Key backups to the DR site is subject to the same dual control and split knowledge principles.

### **6.2.7 Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

No further stipulation other than those stated in sections 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 6.2.4 and 6.2.6.

### **6.2.8 Method of Activating Private Key**

Private keys for DESC Subordinate CAs are activated by a minimum of two privileged users using the principles of dual control and split knowledge. The activation procedure shall use a PIN entry device attached to the CA HSM.

### **6.2.9 Method of Deactivating Private Key**

For the CA private keys stored on online HSMs:

Private keys for the DESC Subordinate CAs shall be deactivated in situations such as:

- The CA HSM is manually switched off,
- There is a power failure within the CA facilities,
- The Subordinate CA HSM is operated outside the range of supported temperatures.
- The HSM detects a security breach and deletes all key material within its internal memory.

When private keys are deactivated, they shall be cleared from memory before the memory is deallocated and shall be kept in encrypted form only. Any disk space where keys were stored shall be over-written before the space is released to the operating system.

For the CA private keys stored on offline HSMs:

The HSMs used for the CA key ceremony are deactivated at the end of the ceremony which prevents any further use of the CA private keys. This activity applies to the principles of multi-person control and split knowledge and shall always be witnessed by the relevant personnel (The Dubai PKI PA, auditor). The HSMs are safely powered off at the end of the ceremony, and all material used during the ceremony are stored inside a dedicated safes inside the secure enclave.

### **6.2.10 Method of Destroying Private Key**

At the end of their lifetime, taking into account business purpose and legal obligations, DESC Subordinate CAs private keys shall be destroyed by multi-person presence, including at least one representative of the Dubai PKI PA, in order to ensure that these private keys cannot ever be retrieved and used again.

The key destruction process is documented in Cryptographic Devices Lifecycle Management Policy and Procedure. Any associated records are archived.

The decision for private key destruction outside the context of the end of its lifetime needs to be authorized in writing by multiple members of the Dubai PKI PA. This decision includes the assignment of the personnel.

### **6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating**

#### **6.2.11.1 DESC Subordinate CAs**

The CAs shall use a Cryptographic Device certified to FIPS 140-2 Level 3 or ISO 15408 Common Criteria (CC) EAL 4+ or above.

#### **6.2.11.2 Subscribers**

The Cryptographic modules used for Subscribers' key generation and storage are at least compliant to FIPS 140-2 Level 2.

## **6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair Management**

### **6.3.1 Public Key Archival**

Refer to section 5.5 of this CP.

### 6.3.2 Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods

- The maximum operational period of the CA's key pair shall be set for eight years. Periodic re-key and notice requirements must be defined to avoid disruption of CA services.
- The maximum operational period for a subscriber's key pair shall generally be five years unless otherwise specified in the applicable CPS.

## 6.4 Activation Data

### 6.4.1 Activation Data Generation and Installation

#### 6.4.1.1 CA Key Generation

DESC Subordinate CAs activation data correspond to PIN and passwords that are used to activate HSMs hosting CA keys. CA keys and their activation data shall be generated in accordance with the requirements of section 6.2, using security tokens for the protection of the CA's private key.

During the key generation ceremony of DESC Subordinate CAs, trusted individuals (key custodians) shall receive their activation data. These shall be managed according to section 6.2 of this CP.

#### 6.4.1.2 Subscribers keys

Subscribers shall set and protect the activation data for their private keys to the extent necessary to prevent the loss, theft, unauthorized disclosure and use of these private keys. Such obligation is articulated as part of the Subscriber Agreement.

### 6.4.2 Activation Data Protection

#### 6.4.2.1 CA Key Activation Data

The CA activation data consists of PINs, passwords and accounts that are used to activate the HSMs hosting the CA keys and the CA keys. Activation data is protected by same security controls used for the CA private key protection. A combination of physical security, technical and procedural controls ensure that the CA private keys and activation data is always protected. Refer to section 6.2 of this CP for further details.

#### 6.4.2.2 Subscribers

Refer to section 6.4.1.2 of this CP.

### 6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation Data

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

## 6.5 Computer Security Controls

DESC Subordinate CAs shall perform all CA and RA functions using trustworthy systems that meet DESC security in addition to the present requirements.

### **6.5.1 Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

DESC Subordinate CAs shall be operated according to the following security controls:

- Physical access control to the CA servers shall be enforced
- Separation of duties and dual controls for CA sensitive operations
- Identification and authentication of PKI roles and their associated identities
- Archival of CAs history and audit data
- Audit of security-related events
- Automatic and regular validation of the CA systems' integrity
- Recovery mechanisms for keys and CA systems
- Hardening CA servers' operating system according to best practices and PKI vendor requirements
- Network protection, including intrusion detection systems
- Proactive patch management for the CA systems
- DESC shall enforce multi-factor authentication for all accounts capable of directly causing certificate issuance.

### **6.5.2 Computer Security Rating**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

## **6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls**

### **6.6.1 System Development Controls**

Purchased hardware or software shall be shipped or delivered in a sealed, tamper-proof container and be installed by trained and trusted personnel. Hardware and software updates shall be handled in the same manner as the original equipment

The CA hardware or software shall be tested, deployed and configured in accordance with industry best practices and vendor recommendations. All changes are controlled through the Dubai PKI change management processes.

For offline systems, changes shall be done as part of the a formal ceremony approved and planned by the Dubai PKI PA.

### **6.6.2 Security Management Controls**

The hardware and software used to set up the Dubai PKI shall be dedicated to performing only CA-related tasks. There shall be no other applications, hardware devices, network connections or component software, which are not part of the Dubai PKI, connected to or installed on CA hardware.

A change management process shall be enforced to ensure that the CA systems configuration, modification, and upgrades are documented and controlled by the PKI operations management. For the offline deployment, changes shall be done as part of the a formal ceremony approved and planned by the Dubai PKI PA.

A vulnerability management process shall be enforced to ensure that the CA systems are scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter. The vulnerability management process shall support the processing within 96 hours of discovery of critical vulnerabilities not previously met by the PKI operations team. For offline systems, equipment shall be scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter. Authorized personnel shall ensure up-to-date virus definition databases is applied as needed on those systems.

### **6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls**

No stipulation — this section is intentionally left blank.

## **6.7 Network Security Controls**

DESC ensures maintenance of network security, including managed firewalls and intrusion detection systems.

The network is segmented into several zones, based on their functional, logical and physical relationship. Network boundaries are applied to limit the communication between systems (within zones) and communication between zones, with rules that support only the services, protocols, ports, and communications that the CA has identified as necessary to its operations, disabling all accounts, applications, services, protocols, and ports that are not used in the CA's operations.

Issuing Systems, Certificate Management Systems, and Security Support Systems are maintained and protected in a highly secure network zone.

Offline systems shall be kept in an offline state, located in a high security zone inside a secure safe within DESC secure premises

## **6.8 Time-stamping**

The CAs servers' internal clock shall be synchronized using Network Time Protocol. Offline systems shall rely on its internal clock for time-stamping archive records any purposes or activities for which time is a critical element.

# 7. Certificate, CRL profiles

## 7.1 Certificate Profile

The Certificates and CRLs issued by DESC Subordinate CAs shall comply with the requirements of RFC 5280. For further details, refer to the applicable CPS.

### 7.1.1 Version Number

DESC Subordinate CAs shall issue X.509 version 3 certificates as defined in RFC 5280.

### 7.1.2 Certificate Extensions

DESC Subordinate CAs shall issue certificates with X.509 v3 extensions as defined in RFC 5280 in addition to extensions indorsed by the browsers' root programs. Refer to section 7.1 of the applicable CPS for the details of the contents of the certificates issued by the CA.

### 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers

X.509v3 standard OIDs shall be used. Algorithm shall be RSA encryption for the subject key and SHA256 with RSA encryption for the certificate signature.

### 7.1.4 Name Forms

As per the naming conventions and constraints listed in section 3.1 of this CP.

### 7.1.5 Name Constraints

Name constraints extension is not supported.

### 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object Identifier

DESC Subordinate CAs shall use certificate policy object identifiers that are defined as part of OID scheme for the Dubai PKI. Refer to the ASN1 definitions described section 7.1 of the applicable CPS.

### 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints Extension

Policy constraints extension is not supported .

### 7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

DESC Subordinate CAs shall use policy qualifiers as per the RFC 5280. Refer to the ASN1 definitions described section 7.1 of the applicable CPS.

### 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for Critical Certificate Extensions

Processing of certificate policies extensions shall conform with the RFC 5280.

## 7.2 CRL Profile

The version field in the certificate shall state 1, indicating X.509v2 CRL.

The CRL profile must comply with the requirements of RFC 5280.

For further details, please refer to the applicable CPS.

### **7.2.1 Version Number(s)**

The version field in the certificate states 1, indicating X.509v2 CRL.

### **7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions**

The CRL extensions shall contain the CRL number (a sequential number incremented with each new CRL produced).

## **7.3 OCSP Profile**

The OCSP profile must comply with the requirements of RFC 6960.

OCSP response signing certificates must the use of the following extensions:

- Key usage (not critical)
- Authority key ID (not critical)
- Extended key usage (critical)
- OCSP no check (not critical)

For further details, please refer to the applicable CPS.

# 8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments

## 8.1 Frequency or Circumstances of Assessments

DESC shall organize compliance audits to ensure that it meets requirements, standards, procedures and service levels according to this CP at least on an annual basis. DESC shall accept this auditing of its own practices and procedures and will make the audit report publicly available no later than three months after the end of the audit period. The Dubai PKI PA shall evaluate the results of such audits before further implementing them.

## 8.2 Identity and Qualifications of the Assessor

To carry out the audits, an independent auditor shall be appointed, that shall not be affiliated directly or indirectly in any way with DESC nor any person having any conflicting interests thereof.

These audits will be performed by qualified auditors who fulfill the following requirements:

- Independence from the subject of the audit
- The ability to conduct an audit that addresses the WebTrust criteria specified above
- Employs individuals who have proficiency in examining PKI technology, information security tools and techniques, information technology and security auditing, and the third-party attestation function
- Licensed by WebTrust
- Bound by law, government regulation, or professional code of ethics
- Except in the case of an Internal Government Auditing Agency, maintains Professional Liability/Errors & Omissions insurance with policy limits of at least US\$1m in coverage.

## 8.3 Assessor's Relationship to Assessed Party

The entity that performs the annual audit SHALL be completely independent of the CA.

## 8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment

The compliance audits will verify whether the Dubai PKI operations environment is in compliance with the this CP, the applicable CPS and supporting operational policies and procedures.

## 8.5 Actions Taken as a Result of Deficiency

Deficiencies identified by the auditor during the compliance audit will determine the actions to be taken. The Dubai PKI PA is responsible for ensuring that remediation actions are documented taken within an adequate timeframe corresponding to the significance of identified matters.

## 8.6 Communication of Results

The external Audit Compliance Report, including identification of corrective measures taken or being taken by the audited party, shall be provided to Dubai PKI PA. The audit Report shall be publicly available through the CA repository no later than three months after the end of the audit period.

## 8.7 Self-audits

The Dubai PKI PA, through its compliance function, monitors and strictly controls its adherence to the procedures listed in this CP document and to the Baseline Requirements by performing self-audits on at least a quarterly basis against a randomly selected samples at least three percent of the Certificates Code Signing CA and Timestamping CA.

# 9. Other Business and Legal Matters

Certain Legal conditions apply to the issuance of certificates issued by the CAs implementing this CP as described in this section.

## 9.1 Fees

### 9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees

Refer to the applicable CPS.

### 9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees

Not Applicable.

### 9.1.3 Revocation or Status Information Access Fees

Refer to the applicable CPS.

### 9.1.4 Fees for Other Service

Refer to the applicable CPS.

### 9.1.5 Refund Policy

Refer to the applicable CPS.

## 9.2 Financial Responsibility

### 9.2.1 Insurance Coverage

this CA is covered by existing government insurance provisions. Details of coverage are specified in the applicable agreements.

### 9.2.2 Other Assets

DESC maintains sufficient financial resources to maintain operations and fulfill duties of the Dubai PKI.

### 9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities

Not applicable.

## 9.3 Confidentiality of Business Information

### 9.3.1 Scope of Confidential Information

DESC considers the following as confidential information:

- Subscriber's personal information that are not part of certificates or CRLs issued by DESC Subordinate CAs
- Correspondence between the subscribers and DESC RA during the certificate management processing (including the collected subscribers data)
- Contractual agreements between DESC and its suppliers
- The Dubai PKI internal documentation (technical documentation, operational processes, ....)

### 9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

Any information not defined as confidential (refer to section 9.3.1) is deemed public. This includes the information published at the CA repository.

### 9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information

DESC guarantees the protection of confidential information according to the applicable laws on privacy.

## 9.4 Privacy of Personal Information

### 9.4.1 Privacy plan

DESC observes personal data privacy rules and confidentiality rules as described in this CP. Refer to section 9.4.2 for the cope of private information.

Both private and non-private information can be subject to data privacy rules if the information contains personal data.

Only limited trusted personnel are permitted to access subscribed private information for the purpose of certificate lifecycle management.

DECS does not release any confidential information without the consent of the legitimate data owner or explicit authorization by a court order. When DESC releases private information, DESC ensures through reasonable means that this information is not used for any purpose apart from the requested purposes. Parties requesting and receiving confidential information are granted permission on the condition that they use it for the requested purposes, secure it from compromise, and refrain from using it or disclosing it to third-parties. Also, these parties are bound to observe personal data privacy rules in accordance with the UAE applicable laws.

DESC respects all applicable privacy, confidential information, and trade secret laws and regulations, as well as its published privacy policy in the collection, use, retention and disclosure of non-public information.

All communications channels with DESC/RA shall preserve the privacy and confidentiality of any exchanged private information. Data encryption shall be used when electronic communication channels are used with DESC Subordinate CAs systems. This shall include:

*Dubai PKI – DESC Subordinate CAs  
Certificate Policy*

- The communications link between DESC Subordinate CAs and the RA.
- Sessions to deliver certificates and certificate status information

#### **9.4.2 Information treated as Private**

All personal information that is not publicly available in the content of a certificate or CRL are considered as private information.

#### **9.4.3 Information not Deemed Private**

Information included in the certificate or CRL is not considered as private.

#### **9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information**

DESC employees, suppliers and contractors handle personal information in strict confidence under DESC contractual obligations that at least as protective as the terms specified in section 9.4.1.

### **9.5 Intellectual Property Rights**

DESC owns and reserves all intellectual property rights associated with its own databases, web sites, the CAs' digital certificates and any other publication whatsoever originating from the Dubai PKI including this CP.

When DESC uses software from suppliers, it is possible that this software remains intellectual property of the supplier. This is defined in the license agreement or contract of this supplier.

### **9.6 Representations and Warranties**

#### **9.6.1 CA Representations and Warranties**

DESC shall warrant that their procedures are implemented in accordance with this CP and the applicable CPS, and that any certificates issued under the applicable CPS are in accordance with the stipulations specified.

#### **9.6.2 RA Representations and Warranties**

An RAILRA that performs registration functions as described in this policy shall comply with the stipulations of this Policy and comply with the applicable CPS. An RAILRA who is found to have acted in a manner inconsistent with these obligations is subject to revocation of RA responsibilities.

#### **9.6.3 Subscriber Representations and Warranties**

Subscriber representations and warranties shall be specified in the CA CPS.

#### **9.6.4 Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

Relying Party representations and warranties shall be specified in the CA CPS.

#### **9.6.5 Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

No stipulation.

## 9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties

Within the limitations of the laws in Dubai, DESC cannot be held liable (except in case of fraud or deliberate abuse) for:

- Profit loss
- Loss of data
- Indirect damage that is the consequence of or related to the use, provisioning, issuance or non-issuance of certificate or digital signatures
- Any liability incurred in any case if the error in such verified information is the result of fraud or willful misconduct of the applicant or if it is the result of negligence or with intent to deceive DESC or any person receiving or relying on the certificate
- Any liability incurred as a result of the applicant breaking any laws applicable in Dubai, including those related to intellectual property protection, viruses, accessing computer systems, etc.
- Other damage

## 9.8 Limitations of Liability

DESC does not offer any guarantees or warranties, or enter into agreements that could be the subject of performance penalties, that could lead to legal actions on behalf of subscribers or relying parties.

## 9.9 Indemnities

Not applicable.

## 9.10 Term and Termination

### 9.10.1 Term

This CP remains in force until notice of the opposite is communicated by DESC on its document repository (see Chapter 2 “Publication and Repository Responsibilities”).

### 9.10.2 Termination

Amendments to this document are applied and approved by the Dubai PKI PA and marked by an indicated new version of the document. Upon publishing on the CA repository, the newer version becomes effective. The older versions of this document are also archived on the CA repository.

### 9.10.3 Effect of Termination and Survival

The Dubai PKI PA will communicate the conditions and effect of this CP termination via appropriate mechanisms.

## 9.11 Individual Notices and Communications with Participants

Notices related to this CP can be addressed to DESC contact address as stated in section 1.5.

## 9.12 Amendments

### 9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment

*When changes are required to be done on this CP. The Dubai PKI PA will incorporate any such change into a new version of this document and, upon approval, publish the new version. The new document will carry a new version number.*

### 9.12.2 Notification Mechanism and Period

*The Dubai PKI PA reserve the right to amend this CP without notification for amendments that are not material, including without limitation corrections of typographical errors or minor enhancements. The decision to designate amendments as material or non-material shall be at the Dubai PKI PA sole discretion.*

### 9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed

Major changes to this CP that may materially change the acceptability of certificates for specific purposes, may require corresponding changes to the OID or qualifier (URL).

## 9.13 Dispute Resolution Procedures

Any dispute arising out of or related to the digital certificates issued by the Dubai PKI shall be first addressed to the Dubai PKI PA. If mediation is not successful, then the dispute will escalate to the relevant court in Dubai.

## 9.14 Governing Law

The laws of Dubai shall govern the enforceability, construction, interpretation and validity of the present CP.

## 9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law

The present CP is compliant to relevant, and applicable laws of Dubai.

## 9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions

### 9.16.1 Entire Agreement

*No stipulation.*

### 9.16.2 Assignment

Except where specified by other contracts, no party may assign or delegate rights or duties under this CP, without the prior written consent of DESC.

### 9.16.3 Severability

In the event of a conflict between the Baseline Requirements and any regulation in Dubai, DESC may modify any conflicting requirement to the minimum extent necessary to make the requirement valid and legal in Dubai. This applies only to operations or certificate issuances that are subject to that Law. In

such event, DESC will immediately (and prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) include in this section a detailed reference to the Law requiring a modification of the Baseline Requirements under this section, and the specific modification to the Baseline Requirements implemented by DESC. DESC will also (prior to issuing a certificate under the modified requirement) notify the CA/Browser Forum of the relevant information newly added to its CP. Any modification to DESC practice enabled under this section will be discontinued if and when the Law no longer applies, or the Baseline Requirements are modified to make it possible to comply with both them and the Law simultaneously. An appropriate change in practice, modification to this CP and a notice to the CA/Browser Forum, as outlined above, is made within 90 days.

#### **9.16.4 Enforcement (Attorney Fees/Waiver of Rights)**

*No stipulation.*

#### **9.16.5 Force Majeure**

DESC shall not be liable for any failure or delay in their performance under the provisions of this CP due to causes that are beyond their reasonable control, including, but not limited to unavailability of interruption or delay in telecommunications services.

### **9.17 Other Provisions**

Not applicable.